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Foreword 
 
‚The cult of positionality and the continuous emphasis on the various identitarian predi-
cates of the oppressed present a powerful obstacle to the development of transnational 
solidarity and genuine international cooperation,‛ states the author Mathieu Rousselin in 
this study. 
 
‘Dialogue at eye level’ or ‘partnership among equals’ – the terminology of external cultur-
al relations and foreign educational and cultural policy suggests that cooperation is only 
legitimate if shielded from power relations. Does a paradigm shift exist from dialogue to 
cooperation? How is cooperation possible in power relations?  
 
The author of this study, Mathieu Rousselin, investigates whether international coopera-
tion can be legitimised even when it involves a degree of structural asymmetry among 
participants drawing on critical and postcolonial theories. To this end, the project reflects 
on the possibility of a paradigm shift from dialogue to cooperation. Cooperation requires 
both a linguistic-conceptual and a scientific-technical agreement on the possible causes of 
complex phenomena. 
 
The project forms part of ifa's Research Programme ‚Culture and Foreign Policy‛, in 
which experts address current topics related to culture and foreign policy with the aim of 
involving academics, practitioners, policymakers and the public. The main findings of this 
report were presented and discussed at an internal workshop in Duisburg at the Käte 
Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research and at a public Käte Ham-
burger Lecture titled ‚Postcolonial Approaches Towards Global Cooperation‛ held at ifa 
in Stuttgart. The report benefited from the invaluable input of the participating research-
ers and experts.  
 
We very much thank Mathieu Rousselin for his excellent work and commitment to this 
research project. Special thanks also go to our colleague Odila Triebel for her invaluable 
conceptual input, and to Sarah Widmaier and Isabell Scheidt for their work on the concep-
tion and editing of this project.  
 
In light of ever more complex interdependencies, and in the knowledge that ecological, 
economic and social global risks can only be tackled together, cultural intelligence and 
knowledge about the functioning of global cooperation is indispensable. International 
cooperation at all levels, among different cultures within and across societies is vital if we 
are to face up to today`s global challenges.  
 
Ronald Grätz Markus Böckenförde 
Secretary General, ifa Executive Director/Senior Researcher,  
Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global 
Cooperation Research
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Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether and under which conditions certain forms of cooperation 
that are characterised by a degree of structural asymmetry among partners may nonethe-
less be considered legitimate. In investigating this question, the study will operate in three 
theory-driven sections borrowing from critical theory, post-structuralism and post-
colonialism. Each section will provide a brief presentation of the main theoretical argu-
ments developed by one philosopher, illustrated with extensive direct quotes from rele-
vant original works. This presentation will then be followed by a critical summary. For the 
sake of illustration, theoretical arguments will then be confronted with empirical observa-
tions based on my own participation in the ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ project. Section one 
will argue in favour of the possibility of genuinely horizontal argumentative engagement 
on the basis of Habermas’ discourse ‘ethics’ and theory of communicative action. By con-
trast, section two will introduce Foucault’s genealogical account of the power/knowledge 
interplay to reject the possibility of discursive spaces that would be in a position of exteri-
ority to power relations. Section three will then bring in the writings of Spivak on the 
double aporia of representation in order to highlight the practical obstacles to a subversive 
use of the Master’s knowledge by the subaltern for genuinely emancipatory purposes. 
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Background information 
 
Is genuine horizontality in bilateral and multilateral cooperation ever possible? Can there 
be such a thing as a non-colonialist foreign cultural and educational policy? Is there an 
irrepressible ‘right to be different’ and is every difference necessarily legitimate for the 
sake of pluralism? Under which circumstances and conditions can external homogenising 
pressure or even a peer-pressure towards conformity be legitimised? 
 
Whether it is ‘dialogue at eye level’, ‘cooperation on an equal footing’ or ‘partnership 
among equals’ – the vocabulary of international cultural and educational policy suggests 
that interpersonal and interstate cooperation is legitimate if and only if it is somehow 
shielded from power relations. Drawing on critical theory and postcolonial studies, this 
research investigates whether international cooperation can be legitimised, even if it in-
volves a degree of structural asymmetry amongst participants that results in a power 
advantage for one of the parties involved. 
 
In doing so, this study will tackle the main difference between dialogue and coopera-
tion. As evidenced by initiatives such as the ‘interfaith/interreligious dialogue’ or the 
‘dialogue between cultures’, one enters into a dialogue in order to make one’s position 
clear to the other party and concomitantly to better understand the position of the dia-
logue partner. Cooperation is, however, a more demanding form of social interaction in 
the sense that it explicitly aims to reach a common position on issues that are reportedly of 
joint concern (climate change, migration, terrorism). In addition to broadly overlapping 
interests regarding the issue at stake, cooperation requires both a linguistic-conceptual 
and a scientific-technical agreement on the possible causes of complex phenomena, which 
creates plenty of occasions for all manner of pressures, constraints and arm-twisting. 
 
For this reason, North-South cooperation is regularly criticised by postcolonial re-
searchers as a form of prolongation of imperial modes of interaction. Indeed, the structur-
al asymmetry of participants may lead to situations where the more powerful cooperation 
partner uses their power advantage to force and impose their language, concepts, 
knowledge and techniques/technologies upon the weaker and possibly reluctant coopera-
tion partner. While being aware of this possibility, this research will investigate whether 
asymmetric cooperation may nonetheless be legitimised if it leads to effective problem-
solving and/or generates emancipatory effects. In doing so, close attention will be paid to 
the possibility for the weaker cooperation partner to demand and obtain rational justifica-
tions from more powerful cooperation partners and to oppose the adoption of insufficient-
ly justified measures. 
Background information 
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This tension will be examined on the basis of a critical and reflexive analysis of the 
DAAD project ‚Tunisia in transition‛, involving collaboration between German and Tuni-
sian universities. Even though this project rhetorically embraces cooperative partnership 
and mutual learning, a clear asymmetry can be detected between the German and Tunisi-
an project partners. The project description on the website of Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität München1 states that this international research project has the aim of  
 
“shaping structures in the Tunisian higher education landscape and providing an exem-
plary platform, in particular for Tunisian junior scientists, to work in a networked and 
applied manner. In addition to a research output which is both original and relevant for 
the Tunisian transformation process, the project will thus contribute to the modernisa-
tion of higher education structures in the humanities and social sciences.”2  
 
To this end, methods workshops and seminars on scientific writing were offered in 
Tunisia. 
 
In this context, lecturers from German universities were regularly confronted with 
questions concerning the universality of their scientific standards. In one instance, a fasci-
nating discussion developed between Tunisian participants and German lecturers on the 
subject of determining whether the research methods presented by German lecturers were 
the one and only ‘proper way’ of conducting scientific enquiry. Alternatively, some Tuni-
sian participants argued that there might exist an alternative ‘Tunisian way’ of conducting 
scientific enquiry, that does not necessarily meet ‘Western’ scientific standards and yet 
that might have equal value. 
 
While participants in a scientific dialogue may satisfy themselves with the second per-
spective (existence of competing and equally valid scientific standards), scientific coopera-
tion does, however, require that participants agree on common scientific standards, for 
example given the fact that the project foresees joint research and publication output. As 
far as the DAAD project ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ is concerned, this meant that the scientific 
standards of the more powerful cooperation partners (participants from German universi-
                                               
1 http://www.naher-osten.uni-muenchen.de/forschung/forsch_tunesien/index.html. 
2 „Sie soll in der tunesischen Hochschullandschaft strukturbildend wirken und eine beispielgebende 
Plattform sein, in deren Rahmen insbesondere tunesische Nachwuchswissenschaftler vernetzt und an-
wendungsorientiert arbeiten können. Neben einer originären und für den tunesischen Transformations-
prozess relevanten Forschungsleistung soll damit ein Beitrag zur Modernisierung der Hochschulstruktu-
ren in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften geleistet werden.“ 
Background information 
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ties) were left unchanged and adopted mostly unaltered by the less powerful cooperation 
partners (participants from Tunisian universities). In empirical terms, this offers a power-
ful refutation of the possibility of an authentic co-creation with open-ended outcome 
(Kokreation mit Ergebnisoffenheit). 
 
Yet, this one-sided adoption may be legitimised if the less powerful cooperation part-
ner has the possibility to create an obligation of justification (Schaffung eines Rechtfer-
tigungszwanges) and in particular to demand rational patterns of arguments (Einforderung 
von Begründungsmustern) for the actions of the more powerful cooperation partner, while 
also being in a position to oppose the adoption of norms, rules and standards that are 
insufficiently justified (tatsächliche Widerstandsfähigkeit). 
 
On the basis of self-reflection and reflexive interviews with members of the German-
Tunisian research group ‚Tunisia in Transformation‛, this empirical part of this study 
aims to scrutinise the legitimation strategy of the parties involved. While highlighting the 
practical obstacles to genuinely Habermasian rational-argumentative modes of interaction 
in situations of structural asymmetry, this study reveals that legitimate cooperation re-
quires a high degree of self-critical awareness, along with a sense of responsibility on the 
part of those involved. 
1. Introduction: Dialogue, cooperation and alterity 
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1. Introduction: Dialogue, cooperation and alterity 
 
“Respect for others’ beliefs as the highest value can mean only one of two things: 
either we treat the other in a patronising way and avoid hurting him in order not to ruin 
his illusions, or we adopt the relativist stance of multiple ‘regimes of truth’, disqualify-
ing as violent imposition any clear insistence on truth. What, however, about submit-
ting [the other, together with ourselves] to a respectful, but for that reason no less 
ruthless, critical analysis? This and only this, is the way to show true respect for [oth-
ers]: to treat them as serious adults responsible for their beliefs.” (Žižek, 2009:118) 
 
In February 2015, I was invited to teach a three-day workshop on research designs to a 
group of German and Tunisian doctoral students. The workshop took place as part of the 
DAAD research group ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ and was held at the University of Sousse in 
Tunisia. Given the heterogeneous disciplinary background of participants, the decision 
was taken in agreement with the German and Tunisian research group coordinators to 
focus on the basic components of deductive research designs: the definition and delimita-
tion of a topic; formulation of a research question; identification of the academic field and 
screening of the relevant scientific literature; formulation of a set of falsifiable hypotheses; 
and definition of a hypothesis-testing strategy including data collection, data analysis and 
presentation/discussion of research results. This workshop was designed to provide 
common guidelines for the subsequent research activities of all individual German and 
Tunisian participants, in so far as the project planned joint publications. 
 
1.1 Respect or engage? 
 
It soon became clear that the common guidelines were not suitable for every research 
project. In particular, some participants were planning fairly explorative studies that 
called for more inductive research strategies aimed at generating hypotheses, while others 
had difficulties structuring their research hypotheses in terms of a causal relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. This led to a lively epistemological dis-
cussion in which the comparative merits and shortcomings of various modes of produc-
tion of scientific knowledge were assessed and compared. In the course of this discussion, 
a Tunisian participant half-jokingly suggested that the research methods being debated 
evolved out of, and hence were only applicable to, German/European/Western social 
sciences but were probably not suitable for investigating empirical realities in Tunisia. 
Instead, he playfully asked whether there might exist an alternative, ‘Tunisian way’ of 
conducting social scientific research and of producing scientific knowledge that would not 
meet the German/European/Western standards of scientificity and yet would possess 
absolutely equal value and therefore deserve strictly equal consideration. 
1. Introduction: Dialogue, cooperation and alterity 
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My own response was twofold. On the one hand, I felt that the critique against con-
temporary ‘German/European/Western standards of scientificity’ was actually a critique 
against a positivist understanding of social sciences à la King/Keohane/Verba centred on 
the establishment and, if doable, the quantitative measurement of relations of causation. I 
therefore explained how this understanding had long been challenged within Germany, 
Europe and the West, for instance in the course of the positivism dispute (Positiv-
ismusstreit) between the rationalists around Popper and the Frankfurt School around 
Adorno and Habermas. Rejecting ‘German/European/Western social sciences’ – whatever 
these may be – on the grounds that they are positivist is therefore committing a dual mis-
take: it overlooks the methodological diversity within Germany, Europe and ‘the West’ 
(there are German/European/Western non-positivists) and it ignores the fact that the 
fundamental epistemological dispute between positivists and anti-positivists also travers-
es ‘non-Western’ scientific communities (there are Chinese, Indian and Brazilian positiv-
ists).3 
 
On the other hand and even though I was genuinely sympathetic with the underlying 
postcolonial critique of power on which the dismissal of ‘German/European/Western 
social sciences’ rested, I insisted that it is not sufficient to simply denounce the ‘scientific 
imperialism’ of the West – in parallel, the equal usefulness of ‘autochthonous’ scientific 
practices and the equal validity of the claim of alternative ‘non-Western’ standards of 
scientificity must also be rationally established.4 Stated otherwise, the standard decon-
structionist argument regarding the contingent and historically constructed character of 
                                               
3 The difficulty is, however, that from a structural and perhaps even from a statistical perspective, the 
statement of the Tunisian participant is correct: large-N, standardised, causation-based research is 
indeed the dominant ‘way of doing social sciences’ in the West, a way that is taught within most aca-
demic programmes, factored in by universities in their staffing decisions as well as conveyed and further 
reinforced by the most influential discipline-specific journals. Yet, if one thinks in terms of power and 
oppression, the Tunisian participant is probably wrong in implicitly presenting the situation as a case of 
‘the West’ oppressing ‘the Rest’ – non-positivist researchers in ‘the West’ are just as oppressed as their 
non-positivist colleagues in the ‘non-West’ and are arguably more oppressed (i.e. face greater difficul-
ties getting published, climbing up the academic ladder, etc.) than their positivist colleagues in the ‘non-
Western’ academic world. 
4 In this, I follow a friendly critique of postcolonial and cultural studies that can for instance be found in 
Žižek (2009) – see: “The ‘radical’ postcolonial critique of liberalism thus remains at the standard Marxist 
level of denouncing false universality, of showing how a position that presents itself as neutral-universal 
effectively privileges a certain (heterosexual, male, Christian) culture. *…+ The question is, does this 
suffice to constitute a critique?” (ibid. 126) and “The standard Marxist hermeneutics of unearthing the 
particular bias of abstract universality should thus be supplemented by its opposite: by the properly 
Hegelian procedure which uncovers the universality of what presents itself as a particular position.” 
(ibid. 131). 
1. Introduction: Dialogue, cooperation and alterity 
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contemporary representations of scientificity in ‘the West’ does not mean that any alterna-
tive, ‘non-Western’ construction automatically and necessarily has an equal claim to 
Truth: some modes of producing knowledge are simply more fruitful than others. The 
usefulness of a scientific cooperation project such as ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ lies precisely 
in providing an arena where participants are invited to lay down and confront their 
standards of scientificity while concomitantly subjecting these standards to ‘respectful but 
ruthless critical analysis’, as a result of which initial statements and positions may very 
well be reformulated or even plainly refuted. In this context, invocations of cultural speci-
ficity are never sufficient in themselves. Rather, the discussion ought to focus on the pre-
cise reasons why a singularity challenges and possibly invalidates a model that presents 
itself as potentially universal: either the claim to cultural specificity cannot be rationally 
established and reveals itself empty, a mere instance of ‘narcissism of small differences’, 
as a result of which what presented itself as singular is revealed to be a simple configura-
tion of the Universal; or else the claim to cultural specificity can effectively be substantiat-
ed and out of the Singular emerges a reconfiguration of the Universal, for the greater 
benefit of all parties involved. 
 
1.2 Dialogue and cooperation 
 
This little anecdote has another virtue: it provides a parsimonious, almost chemically pure 
illustration of what is the essential distinction between dialogue and cooperation. Indeed, 
the demand for respect towards one’s difference is the cornerstone of all interfaith or 
intercultural dialogue initiatives: one enters into such a dialogue so as to make one’s posi-
tion clear to the other party and concomitantly to better understand the position of the 
dialogue partner. All positions are thus on a strictly equal footing and any insistence that 
one position may have greater value or even greater validity than any other can indeed be 
‘disqualified as violent imposition’. Had ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ been a scientific dialogue 
rather than scientific cooperation project, each ‘side’ would have presented its ‘way of 
doing research’ while becoming acquainted with the ‘way of doing research’ of the other, 
with the purpose of identifying commonalities and differences in the Tunisian and Ger-
man practice of social science but without reflecting upon the meaning of these common-
alities and differences in cultural practices for social science itself. 
 
Cooperation is, however, a more demanding form of interaction in the sense that it 
explicitly aims to reach a common position on issues that are reportedly of joint concern 
(climate change, migration, terrorism, etc.) or, in the case of a cooperation project in higher 
education and scientific research, to produce a common outcome (joint conference, dou-
ble-degree programme, joint funding application, co-authored publication, etc.). This in 
1. Introduction: Dialogue, cooperation and alterity 
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turn requires that co-operators share a common language, common cognitive frames and 
common methodological instruments. In other words, in addition to a joint interest in the 
issue at stake or in the common outcome, cooperation requires far-reaching linguis-
tic/conceptual and scientific/technical agreement. In practical terms, this means that inter-
national cooperation may overtly take asymmetric forms, even in cases where the overall 
cooperation architecture formally ensures the statutory equality of partners. As far as the 
project ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ is concerned, for instance, ‘international scientific coopera-
tion’ basically meant that the scientific standards of the more powerful cooperation part-
ner (German universities) were transferred and adopted unaltered by the less powerful 
cooperation partner (Tunisian universities), which does not allow us to speak of an au-
thentic process of co-creation with open-ended outcome. 
 
The above anecdote can also be linked with broader theoretical discussions concerning 
the difference between dialogue and cooperation as well as the possible existence of a 
paradigm shift away from a dialogical approach towards more cooperative forms of inter-
action at the international level. The notion of dialogue has been fruitfully imported in the 
disciplines of political science and international relations. For example, Guillaume (2002) 
proposed a dialogical conception of the process of identity construction in international 
relations as an amended form of constructivism in which the primary function of dialogue 
is to help actors negotiate the terms of the identity/alterity nexus: both self-understanding 
and othering are then formed and performed through dialogue. Somehow relatedly, 
Mendieta (2009) suggests a form of ‚dialogical cosmopolitanism‚ as an answer to the 
imperial, directive nature of both Kantian cosmopolitanism and indeed of the European 
Enlightenment project itself. Building upon debates initiated with the reception of Ha-
bermas' work in political science, Linklater emphasised the potential of dialogical politics 
for peaceful conflict resolution and suggested that dialogue may be ‚one of the best means 
of advancing the civilising process in international relations‚ (2005: 154). Interestingly 
however, Linklater also acknowledges the exclusionary and disciplinary effects of dia-
logue and thus ends up advocating a ‘thin version’ of the dialogical principle – a theoreti-
cal move that recalls the cautious attitude of many critical and feminist scholars towards 
dialogue.5 
                                               
5 See for instance Browne (2003: 1): “So often contrasted with the monological dictations of imperial-
ism, ethnocentrism and patriarchy, dialogue, with its potential for inclusivity, representation and politi-
cal transformation, has become one of the most passionately discussed topics in social and political 
theory. However, while dialogue is promoted by its supporters as a pluralising force capable of accom-
modating the moral disagreement inevitable in every sphere of human society, its promise is widely and 
vehemently challenged.“ 
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The discussion on the limits of the dialogical approach and on the possibility of a par-
adigm shift from dialogue to cooperation may benefit from our taking a look at a seeming-
ly unrelated issue – namely the distinction that is frequently drawn between coordination 
and cooperation in a number of fields, from computer science and ethology to social psy-
chology and management research. Although there is no one agreed definition, the major-
ity view holds that coordination is a simpler form of interaction in which agents voluntari-
ly exchange information concerning their individual intentions and behaviours in order to 
avoid redundancies, share best practices or increase efficiency. Cooperation, however, 
usually concerns tasks that cannot be performed or completed by individual agents on 
their own and that therefore demand the active participation of the parties involved, 
acting jointly in the pursuit of the same goal, defined through common agreement. In 
game theoretical terms , coordination games are mutualistic: as in a stag hunt situation 
(Duguid et al. 2014), all parties benefit from working together, so that there is no incentive 
to defect. The epitome of the cooperation game is, however, the prisoner's dilemma: a 
situation where the parties involved must pay a price for their cooperation but may theo-
retically enjoy the benefit of cooperation without paying the individual price. This creates 
a powerful and rational incentive to defect that can be counterbalanced through various 
constraint mechanisms, such as the binding authority of a political ruler (Leviathan), the 
collective endorsement of and commitment to a set of rules that can be enforced upon the 
involved parties even against their will (Social Contract) and the development of reli-
gious, ethical and moral rules of conduct for cooperative behaviour (Tomasello 2009 and 
2016). 
 
1.3 Object and structure of this study 
 
This study investigates whether and under which conditions forms of cooperation that are 
characterised by a degree of structural asymmetry among partners may nonetheless be 
legitimate. In other words, should a scientific cooperation project like ‚Tunisia in Transi-
tion‛ be dismissed from the outset as neo-colonial, as the unacceptable imposition of 
foreign templates upon a reluctant partner purely based on power considerations? Or is it 
possible for the project to be organised and conducted in such a way that it is legitimate, 
and thus acceptable to the Tunisian cooperation partners, despite the clear structural 
power advantage enjoyed by German universities? 
 
In investigating these questions, the study will operate in three theory-driven sections 
borrowing from critical theory, post-structuralism and post-colonialism. Each section will 
provide a brief presentation of the main theoretical arguments developed by one philoso-
pher, illustrated with extensive direct quotes from relevant original works. This presenta-
1. Introduction: Dialogue, cooperation and alterity 
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tion will then be followed by a critical summary. For the sake of illustration, theoretical 
arguments will then be confronted with empirical observations based on my own partici-
pation in the ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ project. Although this is no place to recast yet again 
the dispute between Foucault and Habermas (and between their respective followers),6 it 
nevertheless seems important to offer a succinct overview of the arguments and positions 
of the two philosophers that directly bear on the subject of this study. Section one will 
therefore argue in favour of the possibility of genuinely horizontal argumentative en-
gagement on the basis of Habermas’ discourse ‚ethics‛ and theory of communicative 
action. By contrast, section two will introduce Foucault’s genealogical account of the pow-
er/knowledge interplay to reject the possibility of discursive spaces that would be in a 
position of exteriority to power relations. Section three will then bring in the writings of 
Spivak on the double aporia of representation in order to highlight the practical obstacles 
to a subversive use of the Master’s knowledge by the subaltern for genuinely emancipa-
tory purposes. 
 
 
                                               
6 Interested readers may usefully refer to Samantha Ashenden, David Owen (eds.) (1999): Foucault 
contra Habermas. Recasting the dialogue between genealogy and critical theory. London: SAGE; Michael 
Kelly (ed.) (1994): Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate. Cambridge: MIT Press; 
Bo Isenberg (1991): Habermas on Foucault Critical Remarks, in: Acta Sociologica 34(4): 299-308; Mat-
thew King (2009): Clarifying the Foucault-Habermas debate. Morality, ethics and normative foundations, 
in: Philosophy and Social Criticism 35(3): 287-314; Amy Allen (2009): Discourse, Power and Subjectiva-
tion: The Foucault/Habermas debate reconsidered, in: The Philosophical Forum, Inc 40(1): 1-28. 
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2. Habermas’ communicative action or the circumvention of power relations 
through rational argumentation 
 
“Practical reason no longer resides … in the ethical substance of a specific community, 
but in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative 
content from the validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding.” (Haber-
mas 1996: 296-297) 
 
In his debate with Foucault, Habermas very much set himself up as the ‚strongest con-
temporary defender of the Enlightenment faith in Reason‛, willingly playing the part of 
the ‚progressive intellectual who shares the conservative response to those who seem to 
be trashing the West’s intellectual inheritance, its belief in ‘truth’ and in the possibility of 
rigorous justification for social action‛ (Simon 1994: 948-949). In The Philosophical Dis-
course of Modernity (1987b), Habermas charges post-structuralists and all-out deconstruc-
tionists with logical fallacy, pointing out that their deconstruction of truth discourses in 
itself constitutes a discourse to be deconstructed – by conveniently excluding themselves 
from their deconstruction, post-structuralists thus ‚operate on an unsupportable meta-
level‛ (Matthews 2012: 125). In response to Foucault’s genealogical account of pow-
er/knowledge relations and of their role in the disciplining of bodies, Habermas argues for 
the possibility of conceptually disentangling and even practically shielding reason from 
power in the discursive sphere, as long as the competition for the better argument is or-
ganised on the basis of communicative rather than instrumental rationality. 
 
In his Theory of Communicative Action (1984 and 1987a), Habermas describes how 
communication may escape the distortions and coercions introduced by pre-discursive 
relations of power if it occurs on the basis of a ‚discourse ethics‛ (or, to word it more 
clearly, a discourse theory of morality) in which participants are committed to offering 
reasoned arguments in support of the validity claim included in their speech acts. Such a 
commitment paves the way for a deliberative exchange in which non-discursive factors, 
such as the respective power relations between participants outside of the discursive 
space, may not be invoked in support of a validity claim. Accordingly, even the most 
powerful participant can be forced by weaker participants to offer public reasons to justify 
the truth of his or her utterances. So long as individuals agree to interact ‚through the use 
of speech oriented towards mutual agreement, taking yes/no positions on criticisable 
validity claims‛ (1987b: 322), at the micro level the discursive sphere functions on the 
basis of undistorted argumentative meritocracy. Although relationships of power do not 
disappear, they are circumscribed to the macro level of systems; any intrusion of power in 
a practical discourse thus can and should be the object of universal condemnation on 
moral grounds. 
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2.1 The consensus theory of truth 
 
In his early (untranslated) work on the effect of the ‚linguistic turn‛ on truth theories, 
Habermas argued that the truth of propositions is never established based on sensory 
experiences and on the extent to which a proposition accurately describes the world (cor-
respondence theory), because there can be no direct contact with reality without the me-
diation of language.7 Rather, truth is asserted discursively by providing rational justifica-
tion for the validity claim included in the assertive component of a statement: ‚the idea of 
truth can only be developed with reference to the discursive upholding of validity 
claims‛.8 Although Habermas never quite excludes the possibility of a universal validity 
(Gültigkeit), he clearly favours a form of contextual validity (soziale Geltung) that requires 
proving9:  
 
“With the assertoric sense of her statement, a speaker raises a criticisable claim to the 
validity of the asserted preposition and because no one has direct access to uninter-
preted conditions of validity, ‘validity’ [Gültigkeit] must be understood in epistemic 
terms as ‘validity proven for us’ [Geltung+.” (Habermas, 1996: 14) 
 
On this basis, Habermas coined his ‚consensus theory of truth‛ according to which  
 
“I can attribute a predicate to an object if and only if everyone else who could enter in-
to discourse with me would also attribute the same predicate to the same object. To 
distinguish true propositions from false ones, I take recourse to the judgement of oth-
ers – that is, of all others with whom I could ever enter into discourse (including coun-
terfactually all discursive partners whom I could encounter if my life history were coex-
tensive with the history of human kind). The truth condition of propositions is the po-
tential assent of all others *…+ The universal-pragmatic meaning of truth, therefore, is 
determined in terms of the demand of reaching a rational consensus.” (Habermas 
2001a[1971]: 89) 
                                               
7 “We cannot confront our sentences directly with a reality that is not already permeated by language. 
Hence we cannot identify a class of basic propositions that are self-legitimating and might therefore 
serve as the beginning and end of a linear chain of justifications.” (Habermas 2003: 249) 
8 My translation from the original German: „Darüber, ob Sachverhalte der Fall sind oder nicht der Fall 
sind, entscheidet nicht die Evidenz von Erfahrungen, sondern der Gang der Argumentationen. Die Idee 
der Wahrheit lässt sich nur mit Bezugnahme auf die diskursive Einlösung von Geltungsansprüchen entfal-
ten.“ (Habermas 1973: 218) To be more precise, although a truth claim may be grounded in/supported 
by [fundiert] experience, it is never justified [begründet] by invoking experience since “truth claims can 
be redeemed only through argument”. Hence, the first condition to assert the truth of a validity claim is 
that it does not “conflict with dissonant experience” whereas the ‘discursive redeemability’ – that is: the 
ability to “hold up against all counterarguments and [to] command the assent of all potential partici-
pants in a discourse” – constitutes the second condition for truth (Habermas 2001 a: 88-89). 
9 On this point, see Camargo 2013: 67-91 and Callinicos 2006: 26-29. 
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Accordingly, Habermas’ post-metaphysical truth is a powerfully anti-essentialist no-
tion: substantively speaking, there is no certain and definitive knowledge that could be 
used as a yardstick to assess the truth or falsehood of a discourse. Rather, truth is the 
fragile outcome of a formal but contingent procedure of justification, always subject to 
revision based on future learning processes. The consensus theory of truth has therefore 
been criticised insofar as it ‚misleadingly suggests that we take a proposition to be true 
because it is or can be agreed to by all those concerned, whereas in fact, we ought to agree 
to a proposition because it is true, not the other way around‛ (translator’s introduction in 
Habermas 2003: xvi). Over time, Habermas came to distance himself from his discur-
sive/epistemic conception of truth (whereby truth is equated with ‚ideal warranted assert-
ibility‛) and recognised that ‚the language game of argumentation‛ never quite exhausts 
truth – in contrast to normative rightness, there is more to truth than mere justification.10 
By highlighting the need to understand how argumentative rationality crucially depends 
on a set of tacit beliefs operating performatively from within the lifeworld,11 Habermas 
almost seems to call for a Foucauldian genealogy of the conditions under which warrant-
ed assertibility is produced and accepted. 
                                               
10 “The truth of a proposition does not become an epistemically mediated state of affairs merely in 
virtue of the fact that we can determine whether its truth conditions (which we must interpret in light of 
the appropriate kinds of reasons in any given case) are fulfilled only by means of justification, that is, by 
means of discursively redeeming the corresponding truth claim. *…+ Thus the discursive conception is 
not straightforwardly false, but insufficient. It still fails to explain what authorizes us to take as true a 
proposition we suppose to be ideally warranted.” (Habermas 2003: 252) 
11 “The network of routine practices relies on more or less implicit beliefs that we take to be true against 
a broad background of intersubjectively shared or sufficiently overlapping beliefs. Everyday routines and 
habituated communication work on the basis of certainties that guide our actions. This ‘knowledge’ that 
we draw on performatively has the Platonic connotation that we are operating with ‘truths’—with 
sentences whose truth conditions are fulfilled. As soon as such certainties are dislodged from the 
framework of what we take for granted in the lifeworld and are thus no longer naively accepted, they 
become just so many questionable assumptions. In the transition from action to discourse, what is taken 
to be true is the first thing to shed its mode of practical certainty and to take on instead the form of a 
hypothetical statement whose validity remains undetermined until it passes or fails the test of argumen-
tation. Looking beyond the level of argumentation, we can comprehend the pragmatic role of a Janus-
faced truth that establishes the desired internal connection between performative certainty and war-
ranted assertibility.” (Habermas 2003: 253) 
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2.2 The discourse theory of morality 
 
It sometimes occurs to me that the best answer to Habermas’ unwavering faith in the 
capacity to provide rational justification for one’s validity claim might be given by a three-
year old child discovering the exhilarating power of deconstruction by insisting on asking 
‚but why?‛ after each answer she receives from her overwhelmed parents. To mitigate the 
risk of infinite regress, Habermas resorts to a distinction between ethics (Sittlichkeit) and 
morality (Moralität). In his clear and parsimonious account of that distinction, King (2009: 
290) notices:  
 
“what distinguishes the moral from the ethical is that the moral sphere encompasses 
‘procedural’ or formal questions of justice, which admit of universal answers, whereas 
the ethical sphere encompasses substantive questions of good, the answers to which 
can only be relative and particular.”  
 
Stated otherwise, although they may be rationally discussed, ethical issues almost 
never lead to universal agreement, because they are connected with identities and cultural 
representations.12 By contrast, Habermas’ theory of justice ambitions to formulate an im-
partial judgement on normative claims by means of an argumentative procedure of justifi-
cation bringing together participants in a practical discourse. It is on the basis of this dis-
tinction that Habermas accuses Foucault’s work of the ‚arbitrary partisanship of a criti-
cism that cannot account for its normative foundations‛ (Habermas 1987b: 276). Indeed, 
Foucault’s genealogical method not only deconstructs ethical principles but it also ‚un-
dercuts all moral bases of the sort on which any non-arbitrary political claim must rest‛ 
(King 2009: 288). In the absence of a basic procedure serving as foundational moral princi-
ple (as Habermas’ discourse theory of morality), Foucault’s work remains ‘cryptonorma-
tive’, it can never establish the validity of the normative assumptions on which its rest.13 
                                               
12 “The fact that ethical questions are implicitly informed by the issues of identity and self-
understanding may explain why they do not admit of an answer valid for everyone. But the logic of such 
questions does not completely exclude the possibility of rational answers in this dimension. *…+ The 
hermeneutical clarification of one's identity also appeals to reasons; a self-referential interpretation 
must satisfy the precondition that it admits of assessment in terms of authenticity and inauthenticity *…+ 
The relativization of the validity of ethical statements does not constitute a deficiency but is the result of 
the logic of a question directed to me (or us) alone and ultimately can be answered only by me (or by 
us), though authentic interpretations must, of course, be compatible with valid moral norms.” (Haber-
mas 2001b: 127) 
13 “Anyone who goes beyond procedural questions of a discourse theory of morality and ethics and, in a 
normative attitude, immediately embarks on a theory of the well-ordered, or even emancipated, society 
will very quickly run up against the limits of his own historical situation and his failure to take into ac-
count the context in which his own development has taken place.” (Habermas 2001b: 176) 
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By contrast, Habermas’ own unassailable normative foundation is the ‚discourse eth-
ics‛14 or, more properly speaking, the discourse theory of morality. Kant’s categorical 
imperative is used as a starting point to argue that only those norms that are universalisa-
ble are truly moral.15 This leads Habermas to propose his condition (U) or principle of 
universalisation: for a norm to be valid, it is necessary that  
 
“all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance 
can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these conse-
quences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation)” (Ha-
bermas 1990: 65).  
 
Condition (U) aims at ensuring impartiality and argumentative fairness during the 
discursive exchange – any breaching of condition (U) implies that one position was arbi-
trarily favoured. Under (U), the foundational moral principle of discourse (D) becomes 
that ‚only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval 
of all affected in their capacity as participants in practical discourse‛ (Habermas 1990: 66). 
In this sense, a practical discourse is merely a procedure that allows assessing the validity 
of norms; it does not aim at producing justified norms, which is precisely why the dis-
course theory of morality is not culturally limited: it rests upon ‚universal and necessary 
presuppositions of argumentation‛.16 The negation of the requirement of procedural im-
                                               
14 The expression “discourse ethics” is a misnomer if there ever was one to the extent that it provides 
with a moral and not with an ethical foundation – to the extent that they only admit of contingent 
answers, ethical principles cannot be normatively foundational. 
15 “A categorical imperative that specifies that a maxim is just only if all could will that it should be 
adhered to by everyone in comparable situations first signals a break with the egocentric character of 
the golden rule (‘Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you’). Everyone must be 
able to will that the maxims of our action should become a universal law. Only a maxim that can be 
generalized from the perspective of all affected counts as a norm that can command general assent and 
to that extent is worthy of recognition or, in other words, is morally binding. *…+ The imperative mean-
ing of these commands alone can be understood as an ‘ought’ that is dependent on neither subjective 
goals and preferences nor on what is for me the absolute goal of a good, successful, or not-failed life. 
Rather, what one ‘should’ or ‘must’ do has here the sense that to act thus is just and therefore a duty.” 
(Habermas 2001b: 8) 
16 “Discourse ethics advances universalistic and thus very strong theses, but the status it claims for those 
theses is relatively weak. Essentially, the justification involves two steps. First, a principle of universaliza-
tion (U) is introduced. It serves as a rule of argumentation in practical discourses. Second, this rule is 
justified in terms of the substance of the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation as such in connec-
tion with an explication of the meaning of normative claims to validity. *…+ The second step, which is 
designed to set forth the universal validity of (U), a validity that extends beyond the perspective of a 
particular culture, is based on a transcendental-pragmatic demonstration of universal and necessary 
presuppositions of argumentation. We may no longer burden these arguments with the status of an a 
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partiality amounts to my being unwilling to submit my behaviour to the validity of the 
arguments presented to me by other parties in the practical discourse (‚Whatever you say, 
I will do as I want!‛), which is itself clearly expresses that I am not engaged in moral ar-
gumentation. 
 
2.3 The theory of communicative action 
 
Habermas’ opus magnus is a two-volume investigation into the conceptions of rationality 
underpinning modern sociological and critical theory. Habermas’ overall endeavour can 
be read as a positive reappraisal of the Enlightenment heritage against the pessimism of 
the first generation of Frankfort School scholars who had come to equal the project of 
modernisation with the development of an instrumental mode of rationality that did not 
impede and possibly even paved the way for the advent of totalitarian ideologies (a view 
advocated by Adorno and Horkheimer in their ‚Dialectic of Enlightenment‛). To give a 
more balanced assessment of modernisation, Habermas aims to combine a micro-theory of 
social integration via communicative processes of coordination together with a macro-
theory of systemic integration via economic and political processes of coopera-
tion/competition through markets. For this, he needs a theory of rationality that holds for 
a variety of disciplinary and methodological approaches. He thus proposes his own dis-
cursive, practical and intersubjective (‚postmetaphysical, post-Hegelian‛ – 1984: 2) con-
ception whereby rationality is defined by reference to formal procedures rather than to a 
substantial content.17 On this basis, Habermas distinguishes between two types of rational-
ity: the goal-achieving ‚instrumental rationality‛ that aims to regulate subjects and nature, 
and the coordination-seeking ‚communicative rationality‛ that seeks to reach and foster 
mutual understanding.18 
                                                                                                              
priori transcendental deduction along the lines of Kant’s critique of reason. They ground only the fact 
that there is no identifiable alternative to our kind of argumentation.” (Habermas 1990: 116) 
17 “When we use the expression ‘rational’ we suppose that there is a close relation between rationality 
and knowledge. Our knowledge has a propositional structure; beliefs can be represented in the form of 
statements. I shall presuppose this concept of knowledge without further clarification, for rationality has 
less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use 
knowledge. *…+ These reflections point in the direction of basing the rationality of an expression on its 
being susceptible of criticism and grounding: an expression satisfies the precondition for rationality if 
and insofar as it embodies fallible knowledge and therewith has a relation to the objective world (that is, 
a relation to the facts) and is open to objective judgment. A judgment can be objective if it is undertaken 
on the basis of a transsubjective validity claim that has the same meaning for observers and nonpartici-
pants as it has for the acting subject itself.” (Habermas 1984: 8-9) 
18 “If we start from the noncommunicative employment of knowledge in teleological action, we make a 
prior decision for the concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality that has, through empiricism, deeply 
marked the self-understanding of the modern era. It carries with it connotations of successful self-
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Criticising Weber for his emphasis on purposive rationality, Habermas then further 
distinguishes between two modes of action. In the ‚communicative action‛ mode, social 
coordination is sought and produced through the medium of language and appeals to 
communicative rationality and uncoerced argumentation:19 participation in a practical 
discourse is oriented towards mutual understanding, the transmission/renewal of cultural 
knowledge as well as social integration (solidarity) and allows the formation of identities. 
In the mode of ‚purposive rational action‛ by contrast, language is replaced by the state 
or Capital as steering media for social coordination, which becomes outcome-oriented 
rather than process-oriented, that is: geared towards strategic, success-seeking, utility-
maximising action. In this context, the increasing reliance on state power and/or market 
logics for the discussion and adoption of collectively binding norms tends to cause a gen-
eral shift away from communicative towards purposive rational action, from ‚under-
standing-oriented‛ towards ‚success-oriented‛ discourses in which language loses its 
illocutionary function (reaching understanding) in favour of its perlocutionary function 
(Habermas 1984: 288-295).20 Much of the second volume of Habermas’ theory of commu-
nicative action is dedicated to the analysis of the dire consequences of this general shift on 
the integrity of lifeworlds as they become increasingly secularised and rationalised.21 
                                                                                                              
maintenance made possible by informed disposition over, and intelligent adaptation to, conditions of a 
contingent environment. On the other hand, if we start from the communicative employment of propo-
sitional knowledge in assertions, we make a prior decision for a wider concept of rationality connected 
with ancient conceptions of logos. This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations 
based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of 
argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, 
owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the 
objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.” (Habermas 1984: 10) 
19 “We use the term argumentation for that type of speech in which participants thematise contested 
validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticise them through arguments. An argument contains 
reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the validity claim of a problematic 
expression. The ‘strength’ of an argument is measured in a given context by the soundness of the rea-
sons; that can be seen in, among other things, whether or not an argument is able to convince the 
participants in a discourse, that is, to motivate them to accept the validity claim in question.” (Habermas 
1984: 18) See also “Participants in argumentation have to presuppose in general that the structure of 
their communication, by virtues of features that can be described in purely formal terms, excludes all 
force – whether it arises from within the process of reaching understanding itself or influences it from 
the outside – except the force of the better argument (and thus that it also excludes, on their part, all 
motives except that of a cooperative search for the truth).” (Habermas 1984: 25) 
20 See for instance p. 295: “Thus I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interac-
tions in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with their mediating 
acts of communication. On the other hand, I regard as linguistically mediated strategic action those 
interactions in which at least one of the participants wants his speech acts to produce perlocutionary 
effects on his opposite number.” 
21 This is the root of the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ so vehemently denounced by Habermas for 
tearing off the social fabric of society. Traditional forms of life are discarded and their claims to validity 
undermined so that “everyday consciousness is robbed of its power to synthesise; it becomes fragment-
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2.4 Critical summary 
 
Although it is easy to mock the naïve faith in Reason and the utter impracticability of the 
discourse ethics,22 both arrows largely miss the target if one considers that the primary 
object of Habermas’ overall philosophical project is to arrive at a foundational principle of 
universally acceptable morality on which to pursue normatively valid critique. This he 
believes to have found in procedural requirements ensuring conditions of transparency 
and argumentative impartiality (the ideal speech situation).23 This powerful principle 
does, however, come with a very far-reaching consequence, which is the almost inescapa-
ble character of a demand for argumentative engagement, which Habermas considers to 
be binding even on those who reject it and whose rejection must be argumentatively 
grounded.24 
 
This being said, I consider that four objections ought to be formulated against Haber-
mas’ philosophical system. The first one is the logical consequence of his normative cri-
tique being primarily concerned with formal-procedural issues rather than with substan-
tive-ethical ones. This means that Habermasian critique is powerless against an ethically 
                                                                                                              
ed” (1987a: 355). Interestingly, Habermas by no means considers this colonisation to be a mechanical 
by-product of modernisation – rather, the “cultural impoverishment of everyday communicative prac-
tice” is the result of “an elitist splitting-off of expert cultures from contexts of communicative action in 
daily life” whereas the “one-sided rationalisation or reification of everyday communicative practice” is 
itself caused by “the penetration of forms of economic and administrative rationality into areas of action 
that resist being converted over to the media of money and power because they are specialised in 
cultural transmission, social integration, and child rearing, and remain dependent on mutual under-
standing as a mechanism for coordinating action.” (1987a: 330) 
22 A temptation to which Foucault gave in towards the end of his life: “There is always something which 
causes me a problem [in what Habermas is doing]. It is when he assigns a very important place to rela-
tions of communication and also a function that I would call ‘utopian’. The thought that there could be a 
state of communication which would be such that the games of truth could circulate freely, without 
obstacles, without constraints and without coercive effects seems to me to be Utopia. It is being blind to 
the fact that relations of power are not something bad in themselves, from which one must free one’s 
self. I don’t believe there can be a society without relations of power, if you understand them as means 
by which individuals try to conduct, to determine the behaviour of others.” (Foucault, 1988: 129) 
23 For a full-fledged presentation, see “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justifica-
tion” in Habermas 1990: 43-115. Habermas provides a more succinct account in “Justification and Appli-
cation” 2001b: 56: “in rational discourse, where the speaker seeks to convince his audience through the 
force of the better argument, we presuppose a dialogical situation that satisfies ideal conditions in a 
number of respects, including, as we have seen, freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthful-
ness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in taking positions, and so forth.” 
24 “The binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about, ironically, through the fact that participants 
can say ‘no’ to speech-act offers. The critical character of this saying ‘no’ distinguishes taking a position 
in this way from a reaction based solely on caprice. A hearer can be ‘bound’ by speech-act offers be-
cause he is not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say ‘no’ to them, that is, to reject them 
for reasons.” (Habermas 1987: 73-74) 
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condemnable decision that would meet condition (U) and be reached deliberatively. This 
is particularly true if the affected party does not possess the faculty of articulating its 
concerns argumentatively (mentally disabled) or is deprived of the faculty to use lan-
guage altogether to articulate their concerns, as are non-humans (from sentient animals to 
forests and seas).25 
 
The second and third objections relate to Habermas’ overwhelmingly negative under-
standing of power as the great corrupting force that disrupts lifeworlds and impedes 
communicative action. On the one hand, in his efforts to keep power at bay and circum-
scribe it to the sole systemic sphere, Habermas focuses exclusively on forces of material 
coercion that prevent individuals from physically participating in a practical discourse 
(the state via its monopoly on force and Capital via the uneven distribution of resources). 
What Habermas neglects in this respect are forces of immaterial coercion such as particu-
lar ‚regimes of truth‛ or specific ‚economies of truth discourses‛ as a result of which 
some arguments are more likely to become accepted as ‚the better argument‛ than oth-
ers.26 On the other hand and more fundamentally, Habermas’ entire philosophical edifice 
rests on the strict and clean conceptual distinction he establishes between the sphere of 
power and that of rational communication. Nevertheless, this distinction begs the ques-
tion of the power advantage – and, indeed, of the violence27 – that might arise even under 
the conditions of an ideal speech situation, for instance when participants in a practical 
discourse are not equally fluent in the language in which the argumentation takes place, 
when particular forms of symbolic domination are enshrined in the language, or when 
one participant is able, possibly with the consent of other participants, to erect its concep-
tual apparatus and terminology as the linguistic basis for argumentation. 
 
 
                                               
25 This recognition can be the starting point of a renewed enquiry into actorness and thingness which 
challenges the conceptual dichotomies on which Habermasian thought is constructed – see for instance: 
“What is an 'actor'? Any element which bends space around itself, makes other elements dependent 
upon itself and translates their will into a language of its own.” (Callon and Latour  1981: 286) This 
recasting of actorness that firmly rejects the modernist nature/culture and fact/value distinctions ulti-
mately led Latour to propose a “parliament of things” (1993) and a Dingpolitik or “object-oriented 
democracy” (2005). Interestingly however, the moral foundation for Latour’s Actor-Network Theory 
remains fairly close (and even makes explicit reference) to Habermasian discourse ethics, one however 
that would be extended to non-humans: “no one, as Habermas says so eloquently, can be brought to 
apply the results of a decision if he has not participated in the discussion that led to that discussion.” 
(2004: 171)  
26 Foucault “Il faut défendre la société”, Michel Foucault, éd. Gallimard Le Seuil, coll. Hautes Etudes, 
1997: 22 and “Truth and Power”, in Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp. 109–33 (131–33). 
27 For a discussion of the violence of language, see Žižek 2009: 49-62. 
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2.5 Bearing on the case 
 
The theory of communicative action offers a systematic answer to the critique raised by 
the Tunisian participant mentioned at the beginning of this study and, more generally, a 
fairly optimistic outlook on the possibility of legitimate cooperation in asymmetric set-
tings. In empirical terms, however, several features do not allow ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ to 
be considered as a genuinely Habermasian project. 
 
For starters, the set of formal-procedural requirements (especially the conditions of el-
igibility, language and format of the application) that de facto govern the submission of 
funding proposals led to a situation where the responsibility for the formulation of strate-
gic objectives for the cooperation project clearly lay with the German partner, with only 
very minor involvement on the Tunisian side. In its distinct one-sidedness, the project’s 
mission statement on the website of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München offers 
an unmistakable telltale sign that German universities constitute the normative reference 
point and that the overall objective of the cooperation enterprise is to bring Tunisian uni-
versities closer to their German counterparts. The binational research group aims at  
 
“building and shaping structures in the Tunisian higher education landscape and at 
providing an exemplary platform in particular for Tunisian junior scientists to work in a 
networked and applied manner. In addition to a research output which is both original 
and relevant for the Tunisian transformation process, the project will thus contribute to 
the modernisation of higher education structures in the humanities and social scienc-
es”28 (my translation)  
 
In strictly Habermasian terms, this would still be agreeable if a demand for justifica-
tion could be empirically detected and if, as a result, it could be demonstrated that the 
Tunisian partners were in a position to obtain rational explanations, open to critical dis-
cussion and refutation, for the strategic objectives defined. From what my involvement in 
the project allows me to judge, such an argumentative legitimation did not take place. I 
am not aware of any demand for justification emanating from Tunisian universities re-
                                               
28 Die interdisziplinäre deutsch-tunesische Forschungsgruppe „Tunesien im Wandel“ „soll in der tunesi-
schen Hochschullandschaft strukturbildend wirken und eine beispielgebende Plattform sein, in deren 
Rahmen insbesondere tunesische Nachwuchswissenschaftler vernetzt und anwendungsorientiert arbei-
ten können. Neben einer originären und für den tunesischen Transformationsprozess relevanten For-
schungsleistung soll damit ein Beitrag zur Modernisierung der Hochschulstrukturen in den Geistes- und 
Sozialwissenschaften geleistet werden.“ Available at: http://www.naher-osten.uni-
muenchen.de/forschung/forsch_tunesien/index.html. 
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garding why the overall project set certain objectives rather than others. It is, however, 
possible that the Tunisian universities refrained from such demands at an early stage of 
the cooperation process (identification of local project partners) in order to avoid appear-
ing unprofessional, mean-spirited or uncooperative and not compromise their future 
involvement in the project. 
 
As a matter of fact, I can think of only two situations over the course of the entire co-
operation project (three years) in which a clear demand for justification emanated from 
the Tunisian cooperation partners. In one instance, Tunisian professors expressed their 
discontent with the selection procedure for Tunisian participants: while the German part-
ners were seeking a meritocratic process based on an open and inclusive call for applica-
tions in which participants would be selected for several years, the Tunisian professors 
were keen to retain their power to appoint Tunisian participants on a yearly basis and 
disapproved of a procedure that they felt undermined their authority. In a second case, 
the Tunisian professors criticised the fact that research activities (including participation 
in conferences and opportunities for publication) were made available to doctoral and 
postdoctoral students but not to them. Although Tunisian professors did have the oppor-
tunity to voice their concerns in cooperation meetings, both demands were somehow 
casually dismissed by the German partners (and by me) as mere issues of political control 
and resource allocation. Consequently, these demands were met with rather procedural, 
legalistic answers: rather than engaging in extensive rational argumentation over the role 
of postgraduate students and junior faculty members [Mittelbau], the German side merely 
invoked donor priorities and obligations stemming from the overall cooperation frame-
work. On the one hand, this legalistic approach was factually correct and timesaving; it 
also seemed more respectful than the other course of action – explaining the reasons why 
strengthening the autonomy of Tunisian postgraduates and postdoctorals was normative-
ly desirable to the German partners – which might have antagonised the Tunisian side 
and jeopardised the project altogether. On the other hand, the lack of genuine argumenta-
tive engagement on both occasions, though it perhaps enabled the continuation of the 
project in the short run, acted as a demotivating factor that brought about the progressive 
withdrawal of the Tunisian professors. With a few exceptions, the latter increasingly as-
sumed the role of polite but fundamentally indifferent observers. From this perspective, 
both of their unmet demands for justification can be seen as lost legitimation opportuni-
ties that impeded the development of a sense of co-ownership and that will most likely 
undermine the medium and long-term effects of the cooperation enterprise. 
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The more we move away from the strategic level (objective-setting) and towards the 
‘tactical’ level (general organisation of joint workshops, planning of joint research activi-
ties, definition of publication themes), the more the project seemingly becomes Haber-
masian. This is particularly true at the level of project coordinators, where interaction 
repeatedly occurs on the basis of argumentative reason, with one side making a proposi-
tion together with reasoned statements and asking the other side to take a position and 
amend the initial proposition. Whether in personal meetings or email exchanges, the 
working procedure is fairly inclusive and consensual, with all parties being allowed and 
able to take a stance on the matters discussed. In this context, the arguments presented by 
the Tunisian project coordinators receive full attention and often decisively influence the 
outcome of the discursive process, as was for instance the case with the decision to keep 
the same group of participants rather than rotate on a yearly basis, or the decision to pub-
lish articles as chapters in an edited volume rather than as isolated working papers. The 
German project coordinators appear more pro-active and more self-assertive: the initial 
proposition that is put to discussion usually lies with them, whereas the Tunisian project 
coordinators are in a more reactive position. It is however difficult to determine whether 
this results from personal characters and considerations of seniority (the two German 
project coordinators have been involved in the project as participants before taking over 
as coordinators) or from more structural reasons. 
 
Lastly, as far as the more ‘operational’ level is concerned (concrete organisation of 
workshops, including the selection of speakers and of precise research methods to be 
presented, definition of theoretical and analytical categories, stylistic conventions for joint 
publications), distinctive power asymmetries tend to reappear and the project again 
moves away from Habermasian communicative action. Two examples can be invoked 
here, both to illustrate the extent to which relations of power did indeed permeate the 
day-to-day implementation of the project and to document the efforts that were made to 
remain within the boundaries of argumentative rationality. 
 
The first example relates to the adoption of what at first sight seems to be purely sty-
listic conventions for joint research activities. In one case, a heated debate arose among 
Tunisian participants regarding the appropriate qualification of the Tunisian political 
party Ennahdha (Islamic versus Islamist). After the Tunisian participants presented their 
arguments and counter-arguments on the matter, a few German participants dispassion-
ately suggested the need to ‘stick with international practices’, which brought the debate 
to an end. After a brief screening of the scientific literature, project coordinators then 
proposed to call the party ‘Islamic’, which ‘pragmatically’ became the common rule. Alt-
hough this little episode may seem almost as anecdotal as the one mentioned at the begin-
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ning of this study, it is also problematic (and emblematic) in several ways. First, the validi-
ty of the claim ‚we need to stick with international practices in this matter‛certainly re-
quires substantiation, both in general terms (by specifying under which conditions com-
plying with international standards is advisable and under which conditions it becomes 
acceptable to depart from these standards), and in more specific terms (by determining 
whether the conditions for departing from international standards are met in the case at 
hand) – from a Habermasian perspective, the existence of a majority supporting one par-
ticular argumentative position does not imply that it has the most powerful argument. 
The better argument is measured by the ability to withstand critical scrutiny, not by the 
number of followers. Second, not only are there very cogent reasons to call Ennahdha an 
Islamist party, as I do in my own writings, but in the end the decision on what to call 
Ennahdha is ultimately an ethical one (in the Habermasian sense). It is therefore not pos-
sible to argue that one spelling (Islamic) is neutral, objective and value-free whereas the 
other spelling is political, subjective and value-laden – both spellings are equally ideologi-
cal. Third, the seemingly pragmatic solution found is nothing more than a call for external 
‘experts’ to settle an internal question in such a way that participants in the research 
group are deprived of the possibility of critically assessing the validity claim included in 
the experts’ judgement – i.e. it is an instance of ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’. 
 
Relatedly, participants in the research group were required, both in the author’s 
guidelines for joint publications and on the occasion of a workshop on scientific writing, 
to use an impersonal style, that banishes adjectives and avoids making personal judge-
ments. As explained to me by one of the German project coordinators, the background for 
this requirement was that a number of Tunisian students had an ‚overly militant ap-
proach‛ and had decided to study social sciences ‚in order to change/transform things, 
not to understand‛ [um etwas zu bewegen, nicht um zu verstehen], which that project coordi-
nator felt was not the purpose of the discipline. Although this requirement basically de-
prives much of social theory of any scientific significance, it was not challenged by Tunisi-
an or German participants during the workshop and, therefore, those who held this pecu-
liar view were not required to present arguments in support of their contestable claims. 
To the extent that these guidelines were part of the criteria on the basis of which reviewers 
decided whether participants’ contributions were fit for publication in the edited volume, 
one can thus say that project coordinators relied on vertical power to ensure compliance. 
From the perspective of communicative rationality, not only is this situation regrettable 
for Tunisian and German participants in the research group (who were exposed to unsub-
stantiated validity claims), but it is also a missed opportunity for the workshop speakers 
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and organisers who could have been brought through critical questioning and rational 
argumentation to understand the narrow-mindedness of their initial discursive position.29 
 
                                               
29 Luckily enough, I can testify that Tunisian and German participants alike largely ignored this piece of 
requirement and that they made good use of adjectives and of (substantiated) personal judgements in 
their written contributions to the research group. 
3. Foucault’s genealogy or the impossibility of locating truth outside of power formations 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised?                             29 
3. Foucault’s genealogy or the impossibility of locating truth outside of power 
formations 
 
“Power cannot be exercised unless a certain economy of discourses of truth functions 
in, on the basis of, and thanks to, that power. *…+ We are obliged to produce the truth 
by the power that demands truth and needs it in order to function: we are forced to tell 
the truth, we are constrained, we are condemned to admit the truth or to discover it. 
Power constantly asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and rec-
ords; it institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes it, and rewards it. *…+ 
In a different sense, we are also subject to the truth in the sense that truth lays down 
the law: it is the discourse of truth that decides, at least in part; it conveys and propels 
truth-effects. After all, we are judged, condemned, forced to perform tasks, and des-
tined to live and die in certain ways by discourses that are true, and which bring with 
them specific power-effects. So: rules of right, mechanisms of power, truth-effects.” 
(Foucault 2003: 24-25) 
 
For Foucault, and subsequently most poststructuralist researchers, there can exist no 
communicative space located outside of power formations and working on the basis of 
pure argumentative meritocracy. This, however, does not mean that communication is or 
equals power:30 rather, communication is necessarily penetrated by power because even 
the ‘flattest’ and most horizontal discursive situation can never quite eliminate or offset 
the prior verticality of power relations – starting with the recognition that ‚we are already 
before the very least of our words, governed and paralysed by language‛ (Foucault 
2005[1966]: 325). Ultimately, critique itself is therefore a form of power: first, the critical 
discourse takes place within specific, contextual relations of power between communica-
tors, to which it cannot be external; second, even the critical discourse on power is a 
‘mode of action upon actions’ that aims at producing certain ‘effects of power’ such as 
bringing people to question the legitimacy of modes of domination that present them-
selves as necessary; third, the critical discourse, as soon as it seeks to articulate a true 
                                               
30 See for instance: “It is necessary also to distinguish power relations from relationships of communica-
tion which transmit information by means of a language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic medi-
um. *…+ Power relations, relationships of communication, and objective capacities should not therefore 
be confused. *…+ This is not to say that there is a question of three separate domains. It is a question of 
three types of relationships which in fact always overlap one another, support one another reciprocally, 
and use each other mutually as means to an end. *…+ Relationships of communication imply finalized 
activities (even if only the correct putting into operation of elements of meaning) and, by virtue of 
modifying the field of information between partners, produce effects of power.” (Foucault 1982: 786-
787) 
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discourse on what power is and how it operates, is itself crucially dependent on an econ-
omy of truth discourses that is intertwined with power. 
 
At the core of the Foucault-Habermas dispute there is therefore a conceptual disa-
greement on the nature of power. For Habermas, power is a great corrupting force that 
colonises lifeworlds as well as a steering medium that leads to forms of coordination. 
Power is thus morally condemnable on the grounds that it bypasses participative, under-
standing-oriented and consensus-based communication. For Foucault, however, a society 
free from power relations is necessarily an abstraction – and a rather undesirable abstrac-
tion at that, since power does not merely discipline bodies and minds but also constitutes 
subjects,31 including resisting subjects.32 Yet, rather than leading him to some form of rela-
tivism (‚there is always power, no configuration is better than another‛) or of fatalism 
                                               
31 “It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: 
subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or 
self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.” (Fou-
cault 1982: 781) See also “It is therefore, I think, a mistake to think of the individual as a sort of elemen-
tary nucleus, a primitive atom or some multiple, inert matter to which power is applied, or which is 
struck by a power that subordinates or destroys individuals. In actual fact, one of the first effects of 
power is that it allows bodies, gestures, discourses, and desires to be identified and constituted as 
something individual. The individual is not, in other words, power's opposite number; the individual is 
one of power's first effects. The individual is in fact a power-effect, and at the same time, and to the 
extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has 
constituted.” (Foucault 2003: 29-30) 
32 “The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its 
invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in 
every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere. *…+ Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. *…+. The existence 
[of power relationships] depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adver-
sary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in 
the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebel-
lions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special 
case *…+ But this does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the 
basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat. Re-
sistances *…+ are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible 
opposite. *…+ Are there no great radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But 
more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a 
society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals them-
selves, cutting them up and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and 
minds. Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through appa-
ratuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the swarm of points of re-
sistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities. And it is doubtless the strategic codifica-
tion of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in 
which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships.” (Foucault 1990[1976]: 93-
96) 
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(‚domination is part of life, nothing can be changed‛), Foucault’s recognition of the omni-
presence of power relations marks the beginning of an ethical critique aimed at ‚the anal-
ysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their 
strength or fragility, the conditions which are necessary to transform some or to abolish 
others‛ (Foucault 1982: 791). The late Foucauldian critique of power relations is thus a 
fundamentally emancipatory activity, seeking to foster the development of a practice of 
insight and of enlightened freedom. 
 
3.1 Critique as genealogy 
 
Although he never indulged his readers with a practicable definition, Foucauldian gene-
alogy is perhaps best illustrated as a method of critical enquiry in a 1977 text on ‚Nie-
tzsche, Genealogy, History‛ (re-published in Rabinow 1984: 76-100). There Foucault 
mocks those engaging in a ‚quest for origins‛ on the grounds that they end up both essen-
tialising and legitimising contingent, accidental states of affairs.33 By contrast, the genea-
logical approach emphasises the vicissitudes of history, ‚the details and accidents that 
accompany every beginning‛ (1984: 80). But more importantly, the genealogist’s task is to 
patiently document the mechanisms of exclusion that necessarily accompany the emer-
gence of a historical truth, the silencing of dissident voices: ‚What is found at the histori-
cal beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of 
other things. It is disparity‛ (1984: 79). Genealogy thus offers a powerful remedy against 
self-infatuation as well as fixed (exclusive) identity constructions34 and reveals that any 
                                               
33 “*The pursuit of origin] is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, 
and their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms 
that precede the external world of accident and succession. This search is directed to ‘that which was 
already there,’ the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the re-
moval of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity. However, if the genealogist refuses to 
extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether 
different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or 
that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.” (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 
78) 
34 “Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the genealogist sets 
out to study the beginning – numberless beginnings, whose faint traces and hints of color are readily 
seen by a historical eye. The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and 
displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events. An examination of descent 
also permits the discovery, under the unique aspect of a trait or a concept, of the myriad events through 
which – thanks to which, against which – they were formed. Genealogy does not pretend to go back in 
time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty 
is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate 
the present, having imposed a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes. *…+ To follow the complex 
course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, 
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inheritance is indeed ‚an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers 
that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or from underneath‛ (1984: 81). Tracing a 
genealogical account is thus a liberating, emancipatory endeavour insofar as it frees us 
from the fiction of historical necessity by tracing the fortuitous character of processes that 
governed developments in ideas (birth of new technologies of power that seek disciplin-
ing bodies) and institutions (emergence of prisons as the preferred means for criminal 
punishment). The critical use of history liberates subjects ‚by presenting [them] with other 
origins than those in which [they] prefer to see [themselves]‛ (1984: 96). By outlining the 
contingency of what formations of power present as fixed and necessary, genealogy is 
thus the first step towards an ‘ethics of the self’ in which subjects are able to earn their 
autonomy by de-centring themselves – that is, by practising subjectivation through desub-
jugation.35 
 
The linkage that Foucault establishes between the process of autonomisation vis-à-vis 
power formations and the need for a critical, painstaking historicisation of phenomena 
that present themselves to us as universal and universally valid ultimately means that the 
genealogical method must be turned against modernity itself, understood as a particular 
regime of truth based on rationality and objectivity. Subjugation also operates by means of 
a regime of truth that demands claims to knowledge to be validated with reference to 
specific scientific procedures: genuine emancipation therefore requires interrogating the 
successive historical forms of scientific consciousness. This is the point where Foucault 
and Habermas diverge most evidently. To Foucault, Habermas’ demand for an unassaila-
ble normative foundation of critique amounts to a form of blackmail that prevents any 
serious enquiry into the historical emergence of specific forms of rationality.36 To this 
                                                                                                              
the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the 
faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to 
discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriori-
ty of accidents.” (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 81) 
35 “And if governmentalization is indeed this movement through which individuals are subjugated in the 
reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say that 
critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of 
power and question power on its discourses of truth. Well, then! Critique will be the art of voluntary 
insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of 
the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.” (Foucault 2007: 47) 
36 See Foucault’s interview “Critical theory/intellectual history” in Kelly (1994: 118): “I think that the 
blackmail which has very often been at work in every critique of reason or every critical inquiry into the 
history of rationality (either you accept rationality or you fall prey to the irrational) operates as though a 
rational critique of rationality were impossible, or as though a rational history of all the ramifications 
and all the bifurcations, a contingent history of reason, were impossible.” By contrast Foucault offers 
“isolating the form of rationality presented as dominant, and endowed with the status of the one-and-
only reason, in order to show that it is only one possible form among others.” 
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demand, Foucault (1984: 95) answers ‚that all knowledge rests upon injustice (that there is 
no right, not even in the act of knowing, to truth or a foundation for truth)‛ and warns 
against writing up a docile history that ‚finds its support outside of time and pretends to 
base its judgements on an apocalyptic objectivity *<+ because of its belief in eternal truth‛ 
(1984: 87). Any historical account of modernity thus ought to evidence the genealogy of 
rationality itself, the conditions of birth of the modern faith in reason and its non-linear 
deployment in the scientific method.37 Such a genealogical account of rationality eventual-
ly leads to the recognition of the subjective, perspectival and contextual character of 
knowledge – the rhetorical invocation of such universals as scientific objectivity or undis-
putable facticity merely hides the ‚singular malice‛ of the subject pursuing his will to 
knowledge. Along this line of reasoning, Habermas’ demand for normative foundations 
does not even require a substantive response – instead, it can itself be subjected to genea-
logical scrutiny.38 
 
3.2 The battle for truth 
 
Foucault makes a dual contribution to epistemological debates. First, he affirms that all 
knowledge is rooted, localised, almost positional. In parallel, he dismisses the belief in a 
transcendental, universal truth that would reveal itself under exactly the same traits to all 
rational agents. Against this belief, he offers a genealogical account of the production of 
scientific knowledge with the aim of showing that all claims to rational, scientific truth 
function in a particular ‚regime of truth‛ or ‚economy of truth discourses‛ that is histori-
cally specific, open to revision and revolution (paradigm changes) and that sets norms by 
virtue of which certain discourses are socially accepted as true and others rejected as 
false.39 Building upon this idea, Foucault’s second contribution is the idea of a fundamen-
tal linkage between formations of power and the setting of norms and procedures govern-
ing the production of truth discourses. Although it is at the core of his oeuvre through the 
                                               
37 “Examining the history of reason, he learns that it was born in an altogether ‘reasonable’ fashion-from 
chance; devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars, 
their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their spirit of competition-the 
personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason.” (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 78) 
38 Although Foucault’s death prevented him from doing so, this is the path taken by Foucauldians such 
as Brown (1998) or Tully (1999). 
39 “It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to 
constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of being verified 
or falsified by scientific procedures. In short, there is a problem of the regime, the politics of the scien-
tific statement. At this level it's not so much a matter of knowing what external power imposes itself on 
science, as of what effects of power circulate among scientific statements, what constitutes, as it were, 
their internal regime of power, and how and why at certain moments that regime undergoes a global 
modification.” (Foucault in Gordon 1980: 112-113) 
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concept of power/knowledge, Foucault does not seem to have held definitive views on the 
nature of this relationship between power and truth – in fact, it has been convincingly 
argued (King 2009: 304-305) that the question of truth is one of the key features distin-
guishing Foucault’s genealogical and ethical periods. 
 
Indeed, some of Foucault’s statements suggest that power and truth are bound in a 
fairly unidirectional relationship, with formations of power essentially defining what 
counts as true.40 If these statements are to be taken literally, not only is there no universal 
truth but any invocation of truth in a statement ought to be regarded as an act of power. 
Yet there are in my opinion good reasons to argue that Foucault’s view on the matter is 
not as causally linear and one-sided as sometimes portrayed. For instance, Foucault also 
considered that intellectuals were engaged in a ‚battle for truth or around truth‛ which is 
at its core ‚a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays‛ 
(Foucault in Gordon 1980: 132). In a way that is consistent with Habermas’ distinction 
between morality and ethics, Foucault considers that this battle for truth is not of a sub-
stantive nature (to define what is true) but of a procedural nature, with the aim of adopt-
ing ‚a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circula-
tion and operation of statements‛(ibid. 133). Far from his nihilistic or relativistic caricature 
(‚if all truth is power, then anything goes and no one statement is ever truer than any 
other‛), Foucault thus considers that the battle for truth is worth being fought because not 
all regimes of truth are equal in value and in usefulness. From a normative (Habermas 
would say ethical) point of view, some regimes of truth are more valuable to the extent 
that they ‚allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination‛ 
(Foucault 1988: 129) – in other words, certain economies of truth discourses produce 
stronger disciplinary effects, whereas others leave more space for individual freedoms 
and the kind of ‚techniques of the self‛ that allow desubjugation and self-
transformation.41 
                                               
40 “The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to 
a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the 
child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces 
regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the tech-
niques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true.” (Foucault in Gordon 1980: 131) 
41 “The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticise the ideological contents suppos-
edly linked to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, 
but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not chang-
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3.3 The insurrection of subjugated knowledges 
 
Echoing his acerbic critique of Marxism in ‚The Order of Things‛,42 Foucault’s charge 
against general social theories seeking to understand social relations as a totality is two-
fold:43 first, such theories (understood as Marxism and psychoanalysis) have had inhibit-
ing and hindering effects on social research; second, they did not lead to emancipation, 
since the main societal advances in the sixties and seventies (against sexual morals and 
traditional hierarchies, and against psychiatric institutions) were the product of a form of 
‚discontinuous, particular and local critique‛ that allows ‚an autonomous, non-
centralised kind of theoretical production, *<+ whose validity is not dependent on the 
approval of the established regimes of thought‛(Foucault in Gordon 1980: 81). In lieu of 
general theories, local critique should thus aim at the ‚insurrection of subjugated knowl-
                                                                                                              
ing people's consciousnesses – or what's in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional regime 
of the production of truth. It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which 
would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of 
hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.” (Foucault in 
Gordon 1980: 133) 
42 See “At the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity; it found 
its place without difficulty, as a full, quiet, comfortable and, goodness knows, satisfying form for a time 
(its own), within an epistemological arrangement that welcomed it gladly (since it was this arrangement 
that was in fact making room for it) and that it, in return, had no intention of disturbing and, above all, 
no power to modify, even one jot, since it rested entirely upon it. Marxism exists in nineteenth-century 
thought like a fish in water: that is, it is unable to breathe anywhere else. Though it is in opposition to 
the 'bourgeois' theories of economics, and though this opposition leads it to use the project of a radical 
reversal of History as a weapon against them, that conflict and that project nevertheless have as their 
condition of possibility, not the reworking of all History, but an event that any archaeology can situate 
with precision, and that prescribed simultaneously, and according to the same mode, both nineteenth-
century bourgeois economics and nineteenth-century revolutionary economics. Their controversies may 
have stirred up a few waves and caused a few surface ripples; but they are no more than storms in a 
children's paddling pool.” (2005[1966]: 260-261) 
43 See for instance his lecture from January 7th, 1976 reproduced in Gordon (1980: 80-81): “I would say, 
then, that what has emerged in the course of the last ten or fifteen years is a sense of the increasing 
vulnerability to criticism of things, institutions, practices, discourses. A certain fragility has been discov-
ered in the very bedrock of existence-even, and perhaps above all, in those aspects of it that are most 
familiar, most solid and most intimately related to our bodies and to our everyday behaviour. But to-
gether with this sense of instability and this amazing efficacy of discontinuous, particular and local 
criticism, one in fact also discovers something that perhaps was not initially foreseen, something one 
might describe as precisely the inhibiting effect of global, totalitarian theories. It is not that these global 
theories have not provided nor continue to provide in a fairly consistent fashion useful tools for local 
research: Marxism and psychoanalysis are proofs of this. But I believe these tools have only been pro-
vided on the condition that the theoretical unity of these discourses was in some sense put in abeyance, 
or at least curtailed, divided, overthrown, caricatured, theatricalised, or what you will. In each case, the 
attempt to think in terms of a totality has in fact proved a hindrance to research. So, the main point to 
be gleaned from these events of the last fifteen years, their predominant feature, is the local character 
of criticism.”  
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edges‛ (ibid., 81-86), that is to say paying closer attention firstly to the wealth of empirical 
material that has evaded theorising or even openly contradicts established theories (‚his-
torical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal 
systemisation‛) and, secondly, to naïve, popular, low-level forms of knowledge based on 
everyday practices and commonsense that have been discarded and disqualified by for-
mations of power as insufficiently scientific.44 
 
To Foucault, effective critique at the local level takes the form of a union between the-
se two rejected and discredited strands. This union-association of the versed erudite and 
the ordinary man is facilitated by their sharing a common history of relegation and mar-
ginalisation through scientific knowledge45 – the purpose of this union-association is thus 
the genealogical production of an anti-science that  
 
“entertain*s+ the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate 
knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hier-
archise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of 
what constitutes a science and its objects” (ibid. 83).  
 
Crucially, Foucault makes it very clear that the anti-scientific character of the genea-
logical method does not amount to a rejection of the scientific method as a means of en-
quiry.46 Rather, genealogy evidences the different effects of power that a discourse carries 
                                               
44 “On the other hand, I believe that by subjugated knowledges one should understand *…+ a whole set 
of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive 
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity. I 
also believe that it is through the re-emergence of these low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified, 
even directly disqualified knowledges (such as that of the psychiatric patient, of the ill person, of the 
nurse, of the doctor-parallel and marginal as they are to the knowledge of medicine- that of the delin-
quent etc.), and which involve what I would call a popular knowledge (Ie savoir des gens) though it is far 
from being a general commonsense knowledge, but is on the contrary a particular, local, regional 
knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harsh-
ness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it- that it is through the re-appearance of this 
knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its 
work.” (ibid. 82) 
45 “In the two cases – in the case of the erudite as in that of the disqualified knowledges – with what in 
fact were these buried, subjugated knowledges really concerned? They were concerned with a historical 
knowledge of struggles. In the specialised areas of erudition as in the disqualified, popular knowledge 
there lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the mar-
gins of knowledge.” (ibid. 83) 
46 This, incidentally, is an idea that dates back at least to 1969 with the publication of “The Archaeology 
of Knowledge” where Foucault half-jokingly remarked that “if the critical style is one of studied casual-
ness, then the genealogical mood is one of felicitous positivism.” (Foucault 1972[1969]: 234) 
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when it bears the label ‘scientific’ and when it does not.47 But in strictly procedural terms, 
the anti-scientific knowledge is opened to the same kind of argumentative refutation as 
discourses deemed scientific by formations of power – in other words, even anti-science 
requires a dedicated and disciplined commitment to the ‚gray, meticulous, and patiently 
documentary‛ method of genealogy (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 76). Thus Foucault may 
mockingly call out his opponents:  
 
“Has there been, from the time when anti-psychiatry or the genealogy of psychiatric in-
stitutions were launched – and it is now a good fifteen years ago – a single Marxist, or a 
single psychiatrist, who has gone over the same ground in his own terms and shown 
that these genealogies that we produced were false, inadequately elaborated, poorly 
articulated and ill-founded?” (Foucault in Gordon 1980: 86-87) 
 
3.4 Critical summary 
 
Despite its originality and undeniable aesthetic appeal to all but the most positivistically 
educated readers, Foucault’s philosophy is often disconcerting and discontinuous, in such 
a way that can only frustrate the reader in search of a systematic account of social phe-
nomena, where terms and concepts are neatly disambiguated, precisely defined and care-
fully brought into relation. With Foucault, the form mirrors and reinforces the message: in 
lieu of superb analytical work, what Foucault’s texts have to offer is a confused feeling of 
uneasiness, which the reader is responsible for investigating self-critically in a kind of 
genealogy of her or himself. Through this process, Foucault’s hope is that the reader’s 
initial question ‚what is it in this text that makes me feel uneasy and uncomfortable?‛ will 
be redefined as ‚why did I come to think that a text must respect certain formal rules?‛ 
and eventually as ‚but wait a minute, who produced these rules? When and how were 
they adopted? And do I actually think that these rules are necessary and desirable?‛. For 
now, let us dare to assume that the problem  lies less with the experience that Foucault 
seeks to generate than with what readers of Foucault do with this experience. Using the 
                                               
47 This is why the efforts that certain discourses, such as Marxism, undertake in order to establish them-
selves as being 'scientific’, have to be read as a quest for the kind of recognition, legitimacy and effects 
of power that usually accompany scientific discourses: “When I see you straining to establish the scienti-
ficity of Marxism I do not really think that you are demonstrating once and for all that Marxism has a 
rational structure and that therefore its propositions are the outcome of verifiable procedures; for me 
you are doing something altogether different, 'you are investing Marxist discourses and those who 
uphold them with the effects of a power which the West since Medieval times has attributed to science 
and has reserved for those engaged in scientific discourse.” (ibid. 85) 
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opening pages of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra,48 I would distinguish between three readings of 
Foucault. 
 
The camel’s reading of Foucault is one of miserable, but also hedonistic, resignation. If 
power is always everywhere, permeating all social relations – including rational discours-
es based on communicative action, but also critical discourses presenting themselves as 
potential counter-powers, if there is no escaping the normalising effects of biopower in 
disciplinary societies, then genuine emancipation is impossible and Habermas (1987b: 
284) is right in asking ‚why fight at all? Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why 
ought domination to be resisted?‛. There the camel reveals itself double-faced: to some, 
the realisation that there is no definitive reason to resist domination will come as a heavy 
burden and a cause for depression – these are the sad camels, like those social workers 
discovering in Foucault their personal responsibility in the perpetuation and reinforce-
ment of disciplinary mechanisms; but to others, the same realisation will be erected as the 
ultimate revolutionary strategy in postmodern times, where power ought not to be resist-
ed since it is that very resistance that feeds and sustains power relations – these are the 
joyful camels enjoying life and occupying spaces.49 
 
The lion’s reading of Foucault is deeply nihilist and relativist. If truth and knowledge 
are simple outcomes in a game of power by means of which formations of power are able 
                                               
48 In these pages, Nietzsche describes the three spiritual transformations (or metamorphoses) that the 
soul must undergo to reach maturity. These transformations are metaphorically represented by a camel, 
then a lion and finally a child. The spiritual journey starts with the camel, a zealed beast of burden that 
delights in obeying instructions and takes great pride in carrying heavy burdens. When it is tired of 
merely doing as it is told, the soul turns into a fierce lion that violently opposes all restrictions placed 
upon its own freedom, including restrictions stemming from religious injunctions or social traditions. 
Yet, the fierce lion may only negate and destruct. With the third transformation, the soul becomes 
playful, creative and child-like: it is finally able to develop its own sense of morality. 
49 This was the core of Baudrillard’s sharp criticism in “Forget Foucault” (1977), where he argued that 
Foucault’s theory of power analysed all social relations on the basis of a war analogy, thereby defining 
power but also resistance through the exclusive lens of conflictuality. What Foucault neglected, accord-
ing to Baudrillard, is power’s crucial dependence on active participation, whether positive/supportive or 
negative/critical, of the social body – in the end, frontal revolutionary tactics (protests, demonstrations, 
etc.) provide new energies that can be used and turned around by formations of power. The most 
effective emancipation strategy is thus to stand still, to withdraw and demobilise forces, so as not to 
feed power formations. The idea of “resistance by non-resistance” was also picked up and elaborated 
upon by Derrida (1996: 37-38). Finally, Melville’s character of Bartleby (a calm, dedicated and hard-
working scrivener who suddenly starts meeting all injunctions of his hierarchy with a laconic ‘I would 
prefer not to’) has been an endless source of inspiration to philosophers such as Deleuze (1993: 89-114), 
Derrida (1999: 106), Agamben (1998: 48 and 1999: 243-271), Hardt/Negri (2000: 203-204) and, perhaps 
more surprisingly, Žižek (2006: 381-385 and, indirectly, 2009: 183) and even Badiou (2006: 422). For a 
discussion of the role of Bartleby in French philosophy, see Berkman (2011). 
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to discipline the social body, then, to start with, all claims to universal truth and to scien-
tific knowledge ought to be genealogically ‚deconstructed‛ (to use a non-Foucauldian 
term) to lay bare the will to power that hides at their core. In addition, there is no means 
to rationally arbitrate between competing claims to truth – because rationality is the prod-
uct of a specific and contingent genealogy and because truth is fundamentally perspec-
tival and claims to truth are assessed on the basis of the ‚regime of truth‛ of which they 
are part. The insurrection of subjugated knowledges is thus necessary to liberate discours-
es that have been unduly discredited by formations of power that use scientific 
knowledge solely to ensure social control. Brought to its logical conclusion, this line of 
reasoning implies that all competing discourses have an equal claim to truth, all are dif-
ferent but equally valid perspectives on the same issue; in consequence, any attempt (even 
consensual) to introduce a truth hierarchy between these claims can be rejected as an 
insupportable discrimination. Similarly, formations of power tend to rely on normalisa-
tion techniques to govern minds and bodies. A particular domain is erected as a scientific 
discipline to encourage investigations by scientists and researchers, who then mobilise a 
number of statistical instruments (medical surveys, screening programmes, health tests) to 
measure and assess the frequency of certain health conditions or the respective im-
portance of various sexual practices. After turning the body into an object of scientific 
knowledge, the normal/Gaussian distribution is used to define a standard norm of physi-
cal/mental health or of appropriate sexual behaviour that has powerful disciplinary ef-
fects, given the very strong epistemic and institutional pressure towards conformity for 
individuals at the margins (homosexuals, mentally handicapped, prisoners). Seeking 
lordship over its own desert, the Foucauldian lion is primarily concerned with desubjuga-
tion, with the removal of anything standing in its way, and thus feels entitled to ‚assert 
the right to be different‛(Foucault 1982: 781), to reject any homogenising constraint, any 
pressure towards social conformity and, instead, to violently affirm his or her singularity. 
 
The child’s reading of Foucault emphasises ethical personal growth, it is concerned 
with caring self-transformation rather than violent self-assertion and desubjugation. Here, 
Foucault’s genealogical anti-science remains procedurally scientific, opened to rational 
argumentation and refutation (it is not ‚a sceptical or relativistic refusal of all verified 
truth‛ – ibid.) but challenges the privileges of knowledge (it is ‚an opposition to the ef-
fects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence, and qualification‛ – ibid.). 
Subjectivity and truth remain closely connected, but the stake of the games of truth is no 
longer the legitimation of coercive practices by formations of power; rather, it is the ascetic 
and voluntary self-transformation of the subject that seeks to control itself instead of being 
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controlled by formations of power.50 In this process, knowledge and truth are not mere 
subjugating instruments of power, as the lion would have it – they condition and govern 
subjectivation.51 But truth requires an effort and a disciplined commitment: in the words of 
O’Sullivan (2010: 52) ‚access to truth must involve a prior preparation by the subject who 
is then, in turn, transformed by that very truth‛. For Foucault, this is where philosophy 
meets spirituality. Spirituality (the transformation of the self through love/illumination or 
through asceticism/discipline) is the price to pay for the philosophical quest for truth.52 
                                               
50 See for instance: “does the expression ‘let us liberate our sexuality’; have a meaning? Isn’t the prob-
lem rather to try to decide the practices of freedom through which we could determine what is sexual 
pleasure and what are our erotic, loving, passionate relationships with others? It seems to me that to 
use this ethical problem of the definition of practices of freedom is more important than the affirmation 
(and repetitious, at that) that sexuality or desire must be set free *…+ liberation is sometimes the politi-
cal or historical condition for a practice of liberty. Take for example sexuality. It is certain that a number 
of liberations regarding the power of the male were needed, that it was necessary to free one’s self 
from an oppressive morality which concerns heterosexuality as well as homosexuality. This liberation 
does not manifest a contented being, replete with a sexuality wherein the subject would have attained a 
complete and satisfying relationship. Liberation opens up new relationships of power, which have to be 
controlled by practices of liberty. *…+ Liberty is the ontological condition of ethics.” (Foucault 1988: 114-
115) 
51 “One cannot care for self without knowledge. The care for self is of course knowledge of self – that is 
the Socratic-Platonic aspect – but it is also the knowledge of a certain number of rules of conduct or of 
principles which are at the same time truths and regulations. To care for self is to fit one’s self out with 
these truths. That is where ethics is linked to the game of truth.” (Foucault 1988: 116) 
52 Here is Foucault’s wonderful discussion of philosophy and spirituality in his lecture of 6 January 1982 
(reproduced in Foucault 2005: 15-16): “We will call, if you like, ‘philosophy’ the form of thought that 
asks, not of course what is true and what is false, but what determines that there is and can be truth 
and falsehood and that one can or cannot separate the true and the false. We will call ‘philosophy’ the 
form of thought that asks what it is that allows the subject to have access to the truth and which at-
tempts to determine the conditions and limits of the subject's access to the truth. If we call this ‘philos-
ophy’, then I think we could call ‘spirituality’ the pursuit, practice, and experience through which the 
subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth. We 
will call ‘spirituality’ the set of these pursuits, practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, 
ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etcetera, which are 
not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject's very being, the price to be paid for access to the 
truth. *…+ Spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right. Spirituality postu-
lates that the subject as such does not have right of access to the truth and is not capable of having 
access to the truth. It postulates that the truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge 
(connaissance) *…+ It postulates that for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be 
changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than him-
self. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings the subject's being into play. For as he is, 
the subject is not capable of truth. *…+ It follows that from this point of view there can be no truth 
without a conversion or a transformation of the subject. This conversion, this transformation of the 
subject *…+ may take place in the form of a movement that removes the subject from his current status 
and condition (either an ascending movement of the subject himself, or else a movement by which the 
truth comes to him and enlightens him). Again, quite conventionally, let us call this movement, in either 
of its directions, the movement of eros (love). Another major form through which the subject can and 
must transform himself in order to have access to the truth is a kind of work. This is a work of the self on 
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3.5 Bearing on the case 
 
At first sight, Foucault seems to be grist to the mill of the Tunisian participant rejecting 
German/European/Western social sciences en bloc. Nonetheless, I want to show in the brief 
discussion that follows that this is to a large extent misleading and that Foucault (who 
himself taught at the University of Tunis for almost three years) cannot be invoked in 
support of the view that any mode of social interaction that is characterised by power 
asymmetries is per se illegitimate, whether in a classroom or in the framework of a scien-
tific cooperation project. 
 
With its three basic components (genealogy, power/knowledge and local critique), the 
Foucauldian toolkit is certainly fit for postcolonial critique, where it has been repeatedly 
employed. Using the genealogical method, the Tunisian participant in the research group 
‚Tunisia in Transition‛ may, for instance, easily have argued that the erection of positivist 
methods in social sciences was historically grounded and by no means necessary. By 
contrast, he could have invoked the existence of subjugated methodological knowledges 
indigenous to Tunisia, these being of these ‚naïve knowledges, located low down on the 
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‛ championed by Fou-
cault. Finally, he could have described the process by which they were brought into disre-
pute, ‚disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated‛ as a mere effect 
of power. 
 
In fact, I believe none of these three positions as they stand is truly Foucauldian. To 
start with, all three rhetorical positions remain empty assertions as long as they are not 
firmly established through the ‚gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary‛ work of the 
genealogist, digging up archives, unearthing testimonies, comparing historical sources 
and crossing references. Even in the framework of Foucault’s anti-science, controversial 
assertions and polemical statements are not placed at the same discursive level as sober, 
                                                                                                              
the self, an elaboration of the self by the self, a progressive transformation of the self by the self for 
which one takes responsibility in a long labor of ascesis (askesis). *…+ Finally, spirituality postulates that 
once access to the truth has really been opened up, it produces *…+ effects which I will call ‘rebound’ 
(‘de retour’), effects of the truth on the subject. For spirituality, the truth is not just what is given to the 
subject, as reward for the act of knowledge as it were, and to fulfill the act of knowledge. The truth 
enlightens the subject; the truth gives beatitude to the subject; the truth gives the subject tranquility of 
the soul. In short, in the truth and in access to the truth, there is something that fulfills the subject 
himself, which fulfills or transfigures his very being. In short, I think we can say that in and of itself an act 
of knowledge could never give access to the truth unless it was prepared, accompanied, doubled, and 
completed by a certain transformation of the subject; not of the individual, but of the subject himself in 
his being as subject.” 
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stringent and well-grounded argumentation.53 For instance, if one wants to insist on the 
historical construction of contemporary forms of scientificity and on the succession of 
historical accidents and contingencies that led an entire generation of seminar lecturers to 
believe that scientific knowledge is knowledge only by virtue of complying with the can-
on of positivism, then one needs to enter into a kind of argumentation similar to that of 
Foucault in his depiction of the ‚Cartesian moment‛which saw memory and meditation 
being replaced as prime forms of reflexivity by methods (see Foucault’s lectures on ‚The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject‛ in 1981-82). Such a genealogical endeavour into Western 
standards of scientificity would reveal the existence of countless points of resistance in 
‘the West’ to positivism and to its methodological claims. On this basis, positivist methods 
would thus need to be qualified as ‘one of the ways’ of doing social science in the West 
(and elsewhere) rather than as ‘the way’, though I suspect it could easily be shown that 
these positivist methods are also the dominant way – that is: the way that is considered 
most serious, most scientific; the way that commands the most respect and carries the 
most prestige; and also the way that opens up positions of power on the academic field. 
That such positivist methods were one way among others of conducting research in social 
science was made very clear on numerous occasions in the framework of the ‚Tunisia in 
Transition‛ cooperation project – as a matter of fact, additional seminars were organised 
                                               
53 This hierarchy between types of argumentative strategies is for instance very clear in one of Foucault’s 
last interviews in 1984 (reproduced in Rabinow 1997: 111-112) – “I like discussions, and when I am 
asked questions, I try to answer them. It's true that I don't like to get involved in polemics. If I open a 
book and see that the author is accusing an adversary of ‘infantile leftism’, I shut it again right away. 
That's not my way of doing things; I don't belong to the world of people who do things that way. I insist 
on this difference as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the 
search for the truth and the relation to the other. In the serious play of questions and answers, in the 
work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. 
They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the 
right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more 
information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the 
person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; 
by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dia-
logue he is tied to the questioning of the other. Questions and answers depend on a game-a game that 
is at once pleasant and difficult-in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights 
given him by the other and by the accepted form of the dialogue. The polemicist, on the other hand, 
proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On princi-
ple, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the 
person he confronts is not a partner in the search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is 
wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then, the game consists 
not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him, as interlocu-
tor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a 
difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from 
the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.” 
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on alternative, non-positivist research methods (in particular hermeneutical and ethno-
graphical methods). 
 
Similarly, invoking the existence of local subjugated knowledges in the form of a ‘Tu-
nisian way of doing social sciences’ can only be a first step towards their effective insur-
rection. In order to ascertain the right to be methodologically different, the second step 
would require the mobilisation of a vast amount of empirical contents generated through 
immense erudition, which would uncontrovertibly demonstrate the existence, somewhere 
in the academic shadow, of an entire body of knowledge, patiently constituted, and yet 
ignored and untapped. Let me be very plain: I am very confident that this reservoir of 
erudite knowledge exists in Tunisia, most likely in the form of personal testimonies of 
mine workers in Gafsa, individual testimonies and collective memories of struggle by 
employees in the branch of tourism, meticulous accounts of daily life in call centres, sto-
ries and pictures of students participating in social movements. Trained historians proba-
bly have a partial and very incomplete access to this rich body of knowledge, which has 
been generated by political activists, trade unionists, social workers and retired miners 
through countless discussions, personal involvement, direct experience, reflected distance. 
 
Now let us suppose that our Tunisian participant were to lead the insurrection of the-
se subjugated knowledges: how would he go about it? Although I do not preclude the 
possibility of altogether different methodologies, my guess is that he would most likely 
meet and conduct interviews with the custodians of these repressed knowledges; alterna-
tively, he could simply talk to them in less formal ways than interviews, in ways closer to 
a conversation, so as not to intimidate them but rather empower them; he could consult 
local archives and minutes of trade-union meetings; he could visit their homes and watch 
private pictures of events; he could take time to get to know these people and learn to put 
their individual stories in a biographical and historical context. He would then need to 
organise this knowledge in some way, according to formats, to recurring themes, to a 
chronology, to regions, to the type of actors involved, to his own perceptions. Finally, he 
would gather his newly gained knowledge in a written form (book, article, blog), in a 
visual form (pictures, photo-book, exhibition), in an interactive electronic form (website, 
social networks), in an audio form (oral testimony, radio account), or in an audio-visual 
form (documentary film). Now, would there be anything properly ‘Tunisian’ about these 
various ways of organising the insurrection of subjugated knowledges? I believe nothing 
at all. These are different techniques for collecting, analysing and presenting information 
and data, which is the very object of methodology. Invoking specific cultural features 
(‘Tunisian-ness’) so as not to look, for instance, into Bourdieu’s solutions to the very same 
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methodological problems in his ‚La Misère du Monde‛ – a book where specific interview 
techniques are developed to tap into the subjugated knowledges of housekeepers, unem-
ployed people, immigrants, low-wage workers, children from large families, and drug 
addicts – would not be a creative desubjugation from Western imperial pow-
er/knowledge, but indeed would be utterly stupid.54 
 
As far as the legitimacy of asymmetric cooperative settings is concerned, I also believe 
that Foucault cannot be used without certain caveats. For starters, Foucault repeatedly 
stated that power-free social interaction is a chimera, at least according to his definition of 
power as ‘action upon an action’. This means that the mere existence of power asymme-
tries is not sufficient ground to delegitimise an entire cooperation project. In addition and 
contrary to Habermas, Foucault tells us that ‚relations of power are not something bad in 
themselves, from which one must free one’s self‛. This, however, does not mean that 
anything goes. Foucault’s interview on ‚the ethic of care for the self and the practice of 
freedom‛ (1988: 129) gives us two guiding principles for good cooperative practices: first, 
‚not to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communica-
tion‛ and, second, the necessity to ‚give one’s self the rules of law, the techniques of man-
agement, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow these 
games of power to be played with a minimum of domination‛. The ‚utopia of transparen-
cy‛criticised in the first principle could also be extended to include the ‚fiction of horizon-
tality‛ in a way that would ban a number of empty but also insincere expressions from the 
vocabulary of foreign cultural policy (‘equal footing’, ‘eye level’, ‘level playing field’). The 
first rule that we can give ourselves is thus to acknowledge the presence of power rela-
tions – only then will we be able to devise rules for cooperative practices that ‚allow these 
games of power to be played with a minimum of domination‛. Among these rules, the 
most important is probably freedom (which, in Foucault’s words, is ‚the ontological con-
dition of ethics‛) including the freedom to refuse to cooperate. 
 
Finally, Foucault’s well-known aphorism ‚Where there is power, there is resistance‛ 
implies that, despite clear power asymmetries between cooperation partners, the Tunisian 
                                               
54 One can refer here to the way Bourdieu addresses a crowd of social workers criticising sociologists for 
being ‘too theoretical’ and ‘too far from the empirical realities of the suburb’ in the beautiful documen-
tary film by Pierre Carles, “La sociologie est un sport de combat” (2001). Bourdieu explains that social 
workers are correct to criticise researchers who act as a “form of symbolic police” and sociologists 
whose work only “legitimates mechanisms of social domination” and continues with this warning “but 
do not let your indignation, which is legitimate and absolutely justified, blind you and thus deprive you 
from instruments of knowledge. *…+ If you refuse to read books [such as “La Double Absence” from 
Abdelmalek Sayad, on the grounds that they are too intellectual] you are cretins!”. 
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side was never deprived of its agency; neither can it be described merely in terms of being 
a passive recipient. As far as ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ is concerned, I can think of three 
modes of resistance available to Tunisian partners throughout the cooperation project: 
first, power can be resisted by demanding rational justification that is open to argumenta-
tive contradiction (though we have already seen that this power was insufficiently used); 
second, power can be resisted if one cooperation partner employs the Bartleby tactics of 
polite withdrawal and non-engagement (adopted by some Tunisian professors when they 
felt that the cooperation project usurped their prerogatives); third, power can be resisted 
by bringing counter-powers into play. For the entire duration of ‚Tunisia in Transition‛, 
Tunisian professors were also engaged in other scientific cooperation projects with French 
and Italian universities, but also with American and increasingly with Arab universities. 
Even though I did not witness any situation where this third strategy was employed, such 
a diversified portfolio of cooperation projects would in theory have allowed Tunisian 
universities to balance out an unfavourable, asymmetrical environment in the event of 
major disagreement with their German partners. 
 
4. Intermezzo: Keeping score in the Foucault/Habermas dispute 
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4. Intermezzo: Keeping score in the Foucault/Habermas dispute 
 
Habermas’ ‚Philosophical Discourse of Modernity‛ provides the most thorough critique 
of postmodern assumptions and theories that I have yet encountered. In view of its poten-
tially devastating effects on postmodernism, the book would deserve a systematic treat-
ment, but its impressive breadth vastly exceeds what is possible to discuss in the frame-
work of this short study. Therefore, rather than seeking to settle the dispute once and for 
all, this short section aims to keep score on a very specific issue raised by Habermas re-
garding Foucault’s work: self-referentiality. 
 
This point of contention is perhaps expressed in its simplest form in the ninth lecture 
of The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity where Habermas (1990: 257) notes that 
‚Foucault exposes himself to palpable objections, because his historiography, despite its 
antiscientific tenor, seeks to proceed both eruditely and positivistically‛. In so doing, 
Foucault’s work faces ‚the methodological paradox of a science that writes the history of 
the human sciences with the goal of a radical critique of reason‛ (ibid. 248). This self-
referentiality is the Habermasian version of Foucault’s ‘blackmail’ regarding the alleged 
impossibility of conducting a rational critique of rationality. In a nutshell, Habermas ar-
gues that the genealogist’s position is not external to the sphere of discourses it seeks to 
submit to genealogy – the truth claims of the genealogist ought to be subjected to the same 
procedures as the truth claims of the discourses of power that the genealogist investigates. 
Who then is to conduct the genealogy of genealogy?  
 
“From this perspective, not only are truth claims confined to the discourses within 
which they arise; they exhaust their entire significance in the functional contribution 
they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse. On the other hand, 
this basic assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must 
destroy the foundations of the research inspired by it as well.” (ibid. 279)  
 
The only escape route Habermas leaves open to Foucault is that his work is not ame-
nable to reason at all and we thus need to ‚change the frame of reference and no longer 
treat the same discourse as philosophy or science, but as a piece of literature‛ (ibid. 337). 
 
I believe this criticism was best addressed by Foucault in an interview from 1980 (re-
produced in Faubion 2000: 243-244), in which he entertained the possibility of  
 
“a book that functions as an experience, for its author and reader alike, much more 
than as the establishment of a historical truth. For one to be able to have that experi-
ence through the book, what it says and does needs to be true in terms of academic, 
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historically verifiable truth. It can’t exactly be a novel. *…+ [The] book makes use of true 
documents but in such a way that through them it is possible not only to arrive at an es-
tablishment of truth, but also to experience something that permits a change, a trans-
formation of the relationship we have with ourselves and with the world.”  
 
If we add Foucault’s statement concerning the morality of the search for the truth (‚In 
the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights 
of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion‛), I think it is safe to consid-
er, as does for instance King (2009), that the late Foucault practically endorses the Haber-
masian discourse ethics. Only he does so with the hope of generating the kind of ‘effects 
of power’ that are usually associated with scientific discourses so as to bring his reader to 
ponder upon the exclusionary effects of the regime of truth of which he is a part. At best, 
Habermas can argue that, if Foucault follows the argumentative rules of communicative 
reason, the Foucauldian discourse then articulates a universal truth claim that truth claims 
are not universal. To which Foucault might himself reply that Habermas’ claim that truth 
claims are and must be universal is the product of a set of contingent historical conditions. 
Together with Kelly (1994: 365-400), I would thus conclude  on the impossibility of deter-
mining with certainty whether historical validity claims may have transhistorical signifi-
cance55 – and reluctantly call it a draw.56 
 
                                               
55 “The status of universals is thus a fundamental issue between Foucault and Habermas *…+ And it will 
certainly remain a major difference between their respective paradigms of critique, because the issue 
itself stems from the self-referentiality of modern critique: Must the general principles introduced 
within modernity as normative criteria of modernity have significance that extends beyond modernity?“ 
(Kelly 1994: 390-391) 
56 I say ‘reluctantly’, because on this particular point, I am more sympathetic towards Habermas’ theory 
of communicative action, which provides an effective though inelegant solution to the self-referentiality 
conundrum. By rendering truth intersubjective and reason communicational in power-free discursive 
spaces, Habermas is able to do away with a subject-centred conception of reason that leads straight to 
self-referential critique. It thus becomes possible to formulate a critique with universal validity. Of 
course, Foucault’s all-pervading power concept means that communicative action becomes just another 
game of power, controlled by formations of power via the production of subjectivity (the regimes of 
truth). Universal critique is impossible if formations of power control the conditions of validity of dis-
courses. 
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5. Spivak’s aporia of representation or the need for a productive undoing of the 
Enlightenment 
 
„The narrow epistemic violence of imperialism gives us an imperfect allegory of the 
general violence that is the possibility of an episteme. Within the effaced itinerary of 
the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced. The question is 
not of female participation in insurgency, or the ground rules of the sexual division of 
labour, for both of which there is ‘evidence’. It is, rather, that both as object of colonial-
ist historiography and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender 
keeps the male dominant.“ (Spivak 1994: 82) 
 
„In the ferocious thrust to be ‘global’, the humanities and the qualitative social scienc-
es, ‘comparative’ at their best, are no longer a moving epistemological force. They will 
increasingly be like the opera, serving a peripheral function in society. As to whether 
they will draw as much corporate funding as opera – whose glamour the curricular hu-
manities and social sciences cannot hope to match – remains to be seen. Already it is 
the relatively glamorous think tanks and monolingual ‘interdisciplinarity’ (read shrinking 
diversity and Americanised monoculture) that are gaining funding. U.S. ‘core curricula’ 
– minimally ‘politically correct’ by including ‘multicultural’ classics – again in English 
translation – are travelling internationally.“ (Spivak 2012: 25-26) 
 
After confronting the respective arguments of moderns (as expressed by Habermas) and 
of post-moderns (as expressed by Foucault) on the possibility of a critical discourse of 
power that is itself freed from power, we now add a third perspective by referring to the 
work of the Marxist, deconstructionist, feminist and postcolonial scholar Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak. Hers is probably the most devastating critique of the possibility of organis-
ing international cooperation in such a way that it does not replicate colonial patterns of 
political domination, economic oppression and cultural erasure. This is because, on the 
one hand, the ‘subalterns’ are constituted as a homogeneous group through the epistemic 
violence of formations of power (including the best intentioned of critical scholars) operat-
ing from the outside. On the other hand, this group is then requested to express its voice 
using the conceptual-linguistic apparatus of the dominant, thereby resulting in a situation 
where the ‘subalterns’ are ultimately dependent upon Western intellectuals to speak for 
them rather than being allowed to truly speak for themselves. 
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5.1 Ideological production and representation of the subject 
 
In her celebrated essay ‚Can the Subaltern Speak?‛, Spivak argues that the entire academ-
ic edifice of critique remains desperately Western, ‚the result of an interested desire to 
conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject‛ (Spivak 1994[1988]: 66). On the 
basis of a discussion of Deleuze and Foucault57 (whose work she effectively accuses of 
helping to ‚consolidate the international division of labour‛ – ibid. 69) as well as of Derri-
da (whom she considers ‚less dangerous when understood than the first-world intellectu-
al masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for them-
selves‛ – ibid. 87), Spivak calls upon Althusser to argue for the need to integrate ideology 
in the theory of the subject58, so as to account for ‚subject formations that micrologically 
and often erratically operate the interests that congeal the macrologies‛. (ibid. 74) This 
allows her to develop a critique of the double conceptual meaning of representation59: 
political representation or Vertretung as the act of ‘speaking in the name of’ within political 
and legal institutions; and symbolic representation or Darstellung whereby a subject con-
stitutes itself and the world, creates meaning through linguistic, theoretical or conceptual 
constructions. This distinction is essential to Spivak as ‚running them together, especially 
in order to say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act and know for 
themselves, leads to an essentialist, utopian politics‛ (ibid. 71). In contrast, what is needed 
                                               
57 Spivak’s attack is directed at the view presented by Deleuze in a conversation with Foucault, which 
requires reading if her critique is to make sense. See in particular: “A theorising intellectual, for us, is no 
longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness. Those who act and struggle are no 
longer represented, either by a group or a union that appropriates the right to stand as their conscience. 
Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts. All of us 
are ‘groupuscules’. Representation no longer exists; there's only action-theoretical action and practical 
action which serve as relays and form networks.” 
58 This will also be Žižek’s argument in “The Sublime Object of Ideology”. Obviously, ideology is not to be 
understood here in the commonsensical way as a “veil” or as a “pair of glass” that obstructs, blurs or 
distorts our otherwise direct relationship to the world. Rather, the word is used to refer to as a collec-
tion of conscious and unconscious beliefs that frame individual expectations, judgements and actions. 
From this perspective, ideologies are both unavoidable and enabling features of the social world: there 
never be an ideology-free world, otherwise individuals would not be able to create meaning and relate 
to the world.  
59 “Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as ‘speaking for’, as in politics, 
and representation as ‘re-presentation’, as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only ‘action’, the 
theoretician does not represent (speak for) the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a 
representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately) *…+. Are those who act and struggle 
mute, as opposed to those who act and speak? These immense problems are buried in the differences 
between the ‘same’ words: consciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation 
and re-presentation. The critique of ideological subject-constitution within state formations and systems 
of political economy can now be effaced, as can the active theoretical practice and ‘transformation of 
consciousness’. The banality of leftist intellectuals’ lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns 
stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent” (1994: 70). 
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is a theory of subject formation that acknowledges the performative character of linguis-
tic-conceptual representations and its effects on political agency – that is, a theory that 
analyses ‚how the staging of the world in representation – its scene of writing, its Darstel-
lung – dissimulates the choice of and need for ‘heroes’, paternal proxies, agents of power – 
Vertretung‛ (ibid. 74). 
 
Another grievance Spivak has against Foucault and Deleuze is their universalisation 
of the individual subject, both as re-presentational Subject (the entity that is constituted by 
formations of power and traversed by flows of desire) and representational subject (the 
political body of the oppressed). By invoking such totalising concepts as Power and De-
sire, both philosophers thus theorise their own transparency in a theoretical construction 
regarded as a mere ‚report on the nonrepresented subject‛: theory becomes a simple, 
transparent and undistorted relay of practices. Both Deleuze and Foucault therefore sug-
gest that the subaltern can know and speak for itself – but through a theoretical construc-
tion they, Foucault and Deleuze, themselves operated. This universalisation of the subject 
is strictly rejected by Spivak on the grounds that  
 
“this S/subject *…+ belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labour. 
It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and 
Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe” (ibid. 75) – “the 
Other as Subject is inaccessible to Foucault and Deleuze” (ibid. 78).  
 
In other words, critique as exercised by postmodern, male, Western philosophers ends 
up, at best unwillingly, reproducing and legitimising the very processes of othering it 
theoretically denounces.60 
 
 
 
 
                                               
60 “It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the pro-
duction of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in 
the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with 
which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary – not only by ideological and 
scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. However reductionistic an economic analysis 
might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire overdetermined enterprise was 
in the interest of a dynamic economic situation requiring that interests, motives (desires) and power (of 
knowledge) be ruthlessly dislocated. To invoke that dislocation now as a radical discovery that should 
make us diagnose the economic (conditions of existence that separate out ‘classes’ descriptively) as a 
piece of dated analytic machinery may well be to continue the work of that dislocation and unwittingly 
to help in securing ‘a new balance of hegemonic relations’.” (ibid. 75) 
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5.2 White men are saving brown women from brown men 
 
To illustrate her argument, Spivak analyses the discourse by which the British Empire 
forbade the practice of sati (ritual suicide/sacrifice of widows) in India. Invoking its moral 
responsibility as ‚the establisher of the good society‛, the coloniser acted out of the belief 
that it espoused the cause of vulnerable women caught in the outdated, barbaric and 
discriminatory religious prescription of self-immolation. In doing so, the coloniser not 
only oversaw the extent to which this prescription was in fact an ‚ideological battle-
ground‛ linked with domestic considerations of matrimonial strategies, property inher-
itance and population control. More importantly, this imposed reading also transformed 
Indian women in objects deserving benevolent protection:  
 
“white men, seeking to save brown women from brown men, impose upon those wom-
en a greater ideological constriction by absolutely identifying, within discursive practice, 
good-wifehood with self-immolation on the husband’s pyre” (ibid. 101). 
 
With this exemplary illustration, Spivak’s point is not to criticise the evolution of the 
legal system that eventually led to the ban on sati (an evolution she welcomes). Rather, 
she is pointing to the construction, by foreign forces, of a double status for Indian widows: 
first, as vulnerable subjects caught in a struggle between obscure religious duties and the 
progressive forces of reason (re-presentation, Darstellung); and second, as specific objects 
of the law requiring increased, additional protection (representation, Vertretung).61 
Through this process, a double-silencing occurred: on the one hand, Indian women were 
not associated in the adoption of new matrimonial laws by a coalition composed of the 
imperial power and of ‘progressive’ local elites; on the other hand, the focus on the largely 
symbolic issue of remarriage left untouched the most pressing concerns of Indian women, 
namely issues related to their material conditions within and beyond the institution of 
marriage. 
 
                                               
61 In times of renewed debate over headscarves and ostentatious religious signs in public spaces, the 
delicate balancing act attempted by Spivak deserves full mention here: “Between patriarchy and imperi-
alism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine 
nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the ‘third-world woman’ 
caught between tradition and modernization. *…+ To see this [original story of the mythic Sati] as proof 
of the feminism of classical Hinduism or of Indian culture as goddess-centered and therefore feminist is 
as ideologically contaminated by nativism or reverse ethnocentrism as it was imperialist to erase the 
image of the luminous fighting Mother Durga and invest the proper noun Sati with no significance other 
than the ritual burning of the helpless widow as sacrificial offering who can then be saved. There is no 
space from which the sexed subaltern subject can speak.” (ibid. 102-103) 
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5.3 Ab-using and learning to learn from below 
 
In her ‚Aesthetic Education in an Era of Globalization‛, Spivak specifies her personal 
stance towards the heritage of the Enlightenment, which is one of ‚productive undoing 
*<+ look[ing] carefully at the fault lines of the doing, without accusation, without excuse, 
with a view to use‛ – or rather, to ‚ab-use‛ it, that is: to use it from below, selectively and 
critically, always bearing in mind the exclusionary effects it carries along (2012: 1-3). To 
Spivak, the spread of the European Enlightenment, fathered by colonisation, operated as 
an ‚enabling violation‛, one that allowed access to emancipatory contents but rested on 
the erasure of local cultures and languages62, effectively placing the postcolonial subject in 
the position of the child of a rape.63 Not unlike Foucault’s use of the genealogical method, 
the postcolonial subject thus ought to retrace the steps of the modern emphasis on ration-
ality in political discourse and to understand it ‚as produced by the philosophers' meth-
odological need for maxims rather than the unquestioned conviction of the supremacy of 
reason‛ (ibid. 16). In contrast to Foucault, however, the purpose of Spivak’s productive 
undoing of the Enlightenment is not to organise the insurrection of subjugated knowledg-
es in the sense of erecting rival, non-Western epistemic/scientific edifices that challenge 
the dominant ‘WASP’ edifice. Instead, the solution is the ‚affirmative sabotage‛ of the 
Enlightenment, the subversive appropriation of the classical tools of European moderni-
ty– as Spivak is keen on reminding us, ‚the invention of the telephone by a European 
upper class male in no way preempts its being put to the use of an anti-imperialist revolu-
tion‛ (Spivak in Alcoff 1991–1992: 115).64 
 
For a university teacher such as Spivak, the privileged institutional space to imple-
ment, and put to the test, the strategy of ab-using is ‚in the classroom, where we give 
accounts of the world beyond‛ (2012: 196). Using Marx's third thesis on Feuerbach (the 
recognition ‚that since the knowledge gap between teacher and taught cannot be circum-
vented, not to let this develop into a power gap is a constant task that will keep society 
always in the state of upheaval that is necessary for liberation‛ – ibid. 7), she establishes a 
connection between ethical training, epistemological engagement and ‘learning to learn’ 
                                               
62 “British colonialism is an enabling violation. Our point has long been that, in the house of language, 
we must remember the violation as well as the enablement.” (ibid. 315) 
63 “Rape is something about which nothing good can be said. On the other hand, if there is a child, that 
child cannot be ostracized because it’s the child of rape. To an extent, the postcolonial is that.” (1994b: 
279) 
64 In other words, Spivak would fall prey to the same accusation of self-referentiality formulated by 
Habermas against Foucault and Derrida. 
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how to teach in a specific situation65 – or, in her inimitable prose: ‚The impossible solution 
is the infinite unguaranteed patience to learn to learn from below how to teach the subal-
tern‛ (ibid. 217). Of particular interest for our purpose in this study is the connection that 
can be established between Habermas’ communicative reason (collective search for truth 
via uncoerced argumentation) and Spivak’s conception of teaching as ‘learning to learn to 
teach from below’ that emphasises ‚persuasion rather than coercion‛ (ibid. 348). Thus 
redefined, pedagogy becomes an effort ‚to act upon the sensibilities of our students, un-
coercively, by their consent‛66 – in other words, an ‚uncoercive rearrangement of desires‛ 
that is the condition of possibility of critique.67 Here, the parallel with the late Foucault’s 
ethics of care for the self are striking. 
 
5.4 Critical Summary 
 
Of the three philosophers discussed so far, Spivak is probably the one who garners most 
praise and universal admiration. The stunning breadth of her erudition would undoubt-
edly have commanded Foucault’s respect, which was notoriously hard to gain – her ‚Cri-
tique of Postcolonial Reason‛ starts with a hundred page-long philosophical discussion of 
‚how Kant foreclosed the Aboriginal; how Hegel put the other of Europe in a pattern of 
normative deviations and how the colonial subject sanitized Hegel; how Marx negotiated 
difference‛ (1999: x), then moves on to expose the figurations of postcoloniality in the 
literary works of Brontë, Shelley, Baudelaire, Kipling, Rhys, Mahasweta and Coetzee, 
before offering a reformulation/elaboration of her theses from ‚Can the Subaltern Speak?‛ 
                                               
65 “Training for the habit of the ethical can only be worked at through attending to the systemic task of 
epistemological engagement. We "learn to learn" (Bateson's more general phrase) how to teach from 
the historico-cultural text within which a certain group of students might be placed.” (Spivak 2012: 9) 
66 “What is to be done here, now, with what we are as agents? I use a working definition of agency: 
institutionally validated action. At the limit the distinction between subject and agent breaks down, for 
the coming-into-being of a subject across that founding gap – the programming of the synthesis with the 
quite-other (which my ancestors, incidentally, located in the synchronicity of the pulmonary system 
using the air of alterity or âtman) – may well be an instituting that keeps us in subjectship. Short of that 
marginal general moment, present in each thought of agency, we can say, in the narrowest possible 
sense, that we are validated by the academic institution, in the United States, as teachers of English 
literature, to act upon the sensibilities of our students, uncoercively, by their consent.” (ibid. 110). 
67 “When I thus assigned myself the agency of response, my institutionally validated agency kicked in. I 
am a teacher of the humanities. In the humanities classroom, I still believed, begins a training for what 
may produce a criticism that can possibly engage a public sphere deeply hostile to the mission of the 
humanities when they are understood as a persistent attempt at an uncoercive rearrangement of de-
sires, through teaching reading. Before I begin, I would like to distinguish this from the stockpiling of 
apparently political, tediously radical, and often narcissistic descriptions, according to whatever is per-
ceived to be the latest Euro-U.S. theoretical trend, that we bequeath to our students in the name of 
public criticism. Uncoercive rearrangement of desires, then; the repeated effort in the classroom.” (ibid. 
372-373) 
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as well as an answer to some of the critical comments raised by modernists (most notably 
Habermas and Jameson) against postmodernism. As a much celebrated translator, com-
mentator and critic of Derrida’s work, Spivak has also been at the forefront of cultural 
critique for over three decades, becoming something of a high priestess for anybody with 
an interest in (post-)Marxism, feminism, decoloniality or deconstruction. Last but not 
least, she has also been involved for many long years in patient grassroots work through 
various rural literacy projects in West-Bengal. To sum up borrowing the words from one 
of her most caustic critic,  
 
“*t+he relations between North and South are not primarily about discourse, language 
or identity but about armaments, commodities, exploitation, migrant labour, debt and 
drugs; and *Spivak’s book Critique of Postcolonial Reason] boldly addresses the eco-
nomic realities which too many post-colonial critics culturalise away. *…+ If Spivak 
knows about graphemics, she also knows about the garment industry. It helps, too, that 
she is among the most coruscatingly intelligent of all contemporary theorists, whose in-
sights can be idiosyncratic but rarely less than original. She has probably done more 
long-term political good, in pioneering feminist and post-colonial studies within global 
academia, than almost any of her theoretical colleagues.” (Eagleton, 1999) 
 
This being said, I would like to take issue with Spivak’s work on three points: her con-
voluted prose, her theory of the subject and her insistence on positionality. So far as style 
is concerned, suffice it to say that her prefaces to Derrida’s translations are often more 
challenging reads than the texts they precede – yet without it always being clear to the 
reader what value such arcane writing adds compared to more straightforward turns of 
phrase (something, to be entirely fair, I would also reproach Derrida with).68 Here also, I 
would thus concur with Eagleton’s judgement that Spivak’s texts are at times being ‚pre-
tentiously opaque‛ and, much more gravely, that her recondite theorising also ‚comes to 
stand in metaphorically for what it signifies‛ thus becoming not just an expression but the 
very embodiment of an aesthetic, elitist critique that threatens to become ‚unpleasantly 
narcissistic when deprived of a political outlet‛, not to mention a convenient way ‚of 
being radical without necessarily being anti-capitalist‛ – something I have myself argued 
elsewhere (Rousselin 2014). In addition, Eagleton rightly points that Spivak’s style is 
arguably more quintessential than subversive of the dominant canonical forms of humani-
                                               
68 For instance, what exactly did Spivak intend when she noted in her preface to “Of Grammatology” 
that “A written preface provisionally localizes the place where, between reading and reading, book and 
book, the inter-inscribing of ‘reader(s),’ ‘writer(s),’ and language is forever at work”?  
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ties in Western academia69 – a point that once more echoes Habermas’ charge against the 
self-referentiality of postmodernism. 
 
The second and third issues that I want to raise – Spivak’s theory of the subject and 
her insistence on positionality – are so intertwined that they are perhaps one single issue 
after all. Indeed, Spivak in ‚Can the Subaltern Speak?‛ does not substantially depart from 
the standard poststructuralist conception of power as a gigantic subjectivity production 
machine that microscopically affects individuals, in their psyches and in their bodies, by 
subjecting them to various disciplinary dispositifs/apparatuses: she brilliantly lays bare 
the politics of representation – the power games involved in the act of Darstellung – and 
she warns against subjects that are constituted from the outside, whether by formations of 
power or by the best intentioned critical scholars. Yet, she seems much more pessimistic 
than Foucault or Deleuze regarding the possibility of de-centred subjects, or of subjectiva-
tion-by-desubjectification, given the dependence of subalterns on the images, tools and 
episteme of the West for both Darstellung and Vertretung. The picture that emerges is that 
of a radical distrust towards the individual, Kantian Subject which is reduced to the sub-
jectified and accused of ‚complicit*y+ in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s 
shadow‛ (1994: 75) – a position which I see as going beyond Foucauldian theses (at least if 
one has in mind the role of spirituality introduced in the ethics of care for the self). The 
                                               
69 “It might just be, of course, that the point of a wretched sentence like ‘the in-choate in-fans ab-
original para-subject cannot be theorised as functionally completely frozen in a world where teleology is 
schematised into geo-graphy’ is to subvert the bogus transparency of Western Reason. Or it might be 
that discussing public matters in this hermetically private idiom is more a symptom of that Reason than 
a solution to it. Like most questions of style, Spivak’s obscurantism is not just a question of style. Its duff 
ear for tone and rhythm, its careless way with verbal texture, its theoretical soundbites (‘Derrida has 
staged the homoeroticity of European philosophy in the left-hand column of Glas’), spring quite as much 
from the commodified language of the US as they do from some devious attempt to undermine it. *…+ 
The endless digressions and self-interruptions of this study, as it meanders from Kant to Krishna, Schiller 
to Sati, belong, among other places, to a politically directionless Left. More charitable readers will see 
this garrulous hotch-potch as a strike at the linear narratives of Enlightenment, by one whose gender 
and ethnicity these violently exclude. If colonial societies endure what Spivak calls ‘a series of interrup-
tions, a repeated tearing of time that cannot be sutured’, much the same is true of her own overstuffed, 
excessively elliptical prose. She herself, unsurprisingly, reads the book’s broken-backed structure in just 
this way, as an iconoclastic departure from ‘accepted scholarly or critical practice’. But the ellipses, the 
heavy-handed jargon, the cavalier assumption that you know what she means, or that if you don’t she 
doesn’t much care, are as much the overcodings of an academic coterie as a smack in the face for con-
ventional scholarship. If an abrupt leaping from Jane Eyre to the Asiatic Mode of Production challenges 
the staider compositional notions of white male scholars, it also has more than a smack of good old 
American eclecticism about it. In this gaudy, all-licensed supermarket of the mind, any idea can appar-
ently be permutated with any other. What some might call dialectical thinking is for others a pathologi-
cal inability to stick to the point. The line between post-colonial hybridity and Post-Modern anything-
goes-ism is embarrassingly thin.” (Eagleton 1999) 
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Spivakian solution is thus to do without the European Othering Subject altogether70 and to 
historicise individuals instead by forcing them to disclose, but also by keeping them firm-
ly confined to, their ‘positionality’.71 
 
Before delving into the two major problems that I see with Spivak’s dismissal of the 
Subject, I would like to start with one point of agreement and one preliminary remark on 
the paradoxical character of her insistence on the positionality of agents within the 
framework of a postmodern approach. First, I am not in principle averse to the idea of 
positioning individuals with regard to selected systemic coordinates that shed light on 
their actions. To take a few examples, I am most definitely interested in the ‘financial 
positionality’ of researchers investigating the noxiousness of smoking or the veracity of 
climate change and I also consider that the belief in the ‘neutrality’ of journalists and, for 
that matter, in the ‘apolitical’ character of scientific production are both supreme forms of 
ideologies – in my opinion, having researchers and journalists alike disclose their norma-
tive preferences (or their ‘ideological positionality’) would bring a number of advantages 
for the clarity and quality of public debates. This does not mean that I hold these various 
agents, researchers and journalists, prisoner of their positionality: it is after all conceiva-
ble, though practically unlikely, to work under conditions of scrupulous independence 
and without any feeling of self-censorship while being concomitantly remunerated by the 
tobacco industry or funded by the Koch brothers. Rather, one could say that the legitimate 
suspicion of bias can only be lifted by openly disclosing the positionality of these agents, 
which is why a number of procedures exist in research and media to try and prevent 
conflicts of interest. This disclosing of ‘financial-ideological positionalities’ is thus fairly 
Habermasian in nature: it allows the meritocratic confrontation of views and arguments 
put forward by agents with different positionalities, with the aim of determining whether 
the positionality of agents carries any argumentative weight at all. For instance, the results 
                                               
70 See: “The question is how to keep the ethnocentric Subject from establishing itself by selectively 
defining an Other. This is not a program for the Subject as such; rather, it is a program for the benevo-
lent Western intellectual. For those of us who feel that the ‘subject’ has a history and that the task of 
the first-world subject of knowledge in our historical moment is to resist and critique ‘recognition’ of the 
Third World through ‘assimilation’, this specificity is crucial. *…+ As a postcolonial scholar, I am not 
troubled that he does not lead me (as Europeans inevitably seem to do) to the specific path that such a 
critique makes necessary. It is more important to me that, as a European philosopher, he articulates the 
European Subject’s tendency to constitute the Other as marginal to ethnocentrism and locates that as 
the problem with all logocentric and therefore also grammatological endeavors (since the main thesis of 
the chapter is the complicity of the two). Not a general problem but a European problem.” (1994: 87-89) 
71 In addition to the last footnote, see for instance: “I am far from averse to learning from the work of 
Western theorists, though I have learned to insist on marking their positionality as investigating sub-
jects.” (ibid. 91-92) 
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of a study on climate change funded by the Koch brothers can be measured against the 
results of a study into the same topic conducted by researchers with a different source of 
funding. And the other way round, one could also argue that the theory of communicative 
action actually commands that the views and arguments of agents with a different posi-
tionality be heard if the intersubjective consensus on truth is to be established. For exam-
ple, if participation in a practical discourse on the effectiveness of austerity politics is 
limited to agents who are ideologically positioned within the field of neoliberal econom-
ics, the results of that argumentative confrontation cannot be said to meet the Haber-
masian truth criterion (reaching the rational consensus of all other involved parties). For 
this criterion to be met, the arguments of participants with a different positionality ought 
to be pondered. The crux of the matter is that only by openly disclosing their positionality 
are participants in a practical discourse ever in a position to determine whether all argu-
ments and counter-arguments received due consideration. 
 
While very sympathetic to the call for a greater emphasis on the various structural 
forces that possibly shape individual preferences, Spivak’s insistence on the positionality 
of agents does not come without a certain irony. Indeed, postmodernism historically 
emerged against the backdrop of various Marxist, psychoanalytic and structuralist ac-
counts of human behaviour that were viewed as exceedingly rigid, totalising and deter-
ministic, immuring individuals in fixed and universal categories such as social classes. By 
contrast, postmodern theorists outlined the historically constructed nature of what were 
previously conceived as universal categories, negated the possibility of a privileged posi-
tion or Archimedean vantage point from where to generate universally valid knowledge 
and eventually sought to reinstate various modalities of Difference (complexity, heteroge-
neity, non-linearity, uncertainty as well as individual processes of decentring, deterritori-
alisation, desubjectification) against the normalising effects of formations of power. As far 
as social ontology is concerned, there is therefore something quite paradoxical in the 
postmodern insistence on positionality, insofar as it deprives individuals of any genuine 
agency and suggests that their actions merely reflect their position as if, for instance, Eu-
ropean theorists were fundamentally unable to make statements that could claim validity 
for a non-European audience – a view that is arguably more rigid and deterministic than 
most structuralist accounts. In addition, since the coordinates on the basis of which the 
position of agents can be determined are ultimately fixed by the formations of power 
through mechanisms of subjectivity production, Spivak’s insistence on positionality effec-
tively amounts to abandoning individuals once and for all in the hands of power struc-
tures and to declaring subjectification both unavoidable and insurmountable. Here again, 
this view is more uncompromisingly deterministic – and I should also say: more pessimis-
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tic and more disempowering – than, say, classical Marxism that did envision the possibil-
ity of as well as specify the conditions for social transformation. 
 
Let us now come to the two objections that I want to raise against Spivak’s line of ar-
gument. The first objection is of a dully practical nature and has to do with the empirical 
difficulty in determining positionality and its effects. Indeed, one needs to specify first, 
out of the almost infinite array of possible coordinates, which ones truly matter for deter-
mining the positionality of agents; second, it is necessary to explain why and how posi-
tionality is expected to limit or restrict the validity claims contained in individual speech 
acts. As far as the first dimension is concerned, I would say that, while not disputing that 
some form of positionality brings both argumentative clarity and argumentative fairness 
in public debate, I also consider most coordinates to be irrelevant or trivial. For instance, 
the insistence on positionality could be invoked to historicise/contextualise in a number of 
different ways: by reference to a geographical unit as Spivak is inclined to do (‘Not a 
general problem but a European problem’) but also by reference to social class (‘Not a 
general problem but a bourgeois problem’), to gender (‘Not a general problem but a male 
problem’), to ethnicity (‘Not a general problem but a Black problem’), to sexual prefer-
ences (‘Not a general problem but a homosexual problem’) and why not also to diet (‘Not 
a general problem but a vegan problem’), to generation (‘Not a general problem but a 
sixtyish problem’) or to any other personal feature (‘Not a general problem but a thwarted 
left-hander problem’; ‘Not a general problem but a Muslim problem’; ‘Not a general prob-
lem but a divorcee’s problem’, etc.). The empirical determination of the positionality of 
agents thus requires a theory of some kind to specify which coordinates are expected to be 
relevant, and above all why it is so. 
 
Although I do not know of any text in which Spivak offers a precise list of the coordi-
nates she deems relevant, her remark on the positionality of European thinkers suggests 
that she considers geography to fall into this category. From a methodological standpoint, 
however, determining the ‘Europeanness’ of a thinker is more arduous a task than it may 
seem. What is, indeed, a European thinker – is it somebody born in Europe, educated in 
Europe or working in Europe? What about non-Europeans working on European issues or 
with European material? What about Spivak herself, an Indian-born, Columbia-based 
researcher specialising in European philosophy and literature – does she count as a ‘Euro-
pean thinker’? Or is she rather to be ‘positioned’ as an Indian scholar, a Marxist, a feminist 
or a deconstructionist? In a way, Spivak seems to herself acknowledge the aporia of the 
positionality that she so vehemently advocates for others: on the one hand and even 
though she routinely borrows from the history and cultural productions of India in her 
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work, ‚Spivak dislikes being identified as a scholar of India, a label she attributes to ‘be-
nevolent racism’‛ (Smith 2002). On the other hand, she rejects the usual theoretical coor-
dinates that are cast upon her work (Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, etc.) and indicates 
that she prefers the considerably more socially gratifying (and self-enhancing) position of 
‘teacher’.72 While Spivak’s comment on her own positionality might be discarded as fla-
grant double-standard, I think it rather ought to be read against the backdrop of her ar-
gument in ‚Can the Subaltern Speak?‛ – the insistence on positionality fixes individuals in 
one configuration of identity from the outside, it somehow immures individuals in one 
singular feature that is supposedly ‘representative’ of them; as such it is an act of power, 
an Othering that paradoxically perpetuates the kind of politics of representation she so 
eloquently described. 
 
The second dimension of the empirical objection is that, even if positionality could be 
determined with reference to the relevant coordinates without reproducing the troubling 
quandary of Darstellung, the ways in which positionality affects the communicative pro-
cess remain very much underdeveloped. In particular, it is unclear whether positionality 
provides ‘background information’ allowing listeners to better understand the validity 
claim contained in a speech act or whether positionality fundamentally defines the perim-
eter within which speech utterances may have a claim to validity. Stated otherwise, invok-
ing the positionality of European thinkers may be (in a Habermasian sense) an argumen-
tative strategy to increase mutual understanding among participants in a practical dis-
course to show how a particular position historically took form; but it may also be (in a 
Foucauldian sense) a genealogical strategy to emphasise the extent to which the argumen-
tative success of one particular position depends upon the concomitant silencing of dissi-
dent voices and thus merely has a ‘contextual’ validity claim. At the risk of overstating the 
point, speaking of Derrida’s positionality as a European thinker may be an effort to retrace 
the intellectual history of Derridean thought, for instance by identifying the concepts 
Derrida borrowed as well as the conditions under which these concepts emerged in Eu-
rope in the first place. Here, ‘Not a general problem but a European problem’ can be taken 
to signify ‘a problem that emerges for whoever works with the same analytical categories 
as Derrida.’ Alternatively, the insistence on Derrida’s positionality as a European thinker 
can also be regarded as implying that the validity claim of Derrida’s philosophical system 
could only be established in front of a European audience but would fail to meet the as-
                                               
72 This permeates through her “Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization”. See also her 2009 
interview with Oscar Guardiola-Rivera in Naked Punch: “I have always had great difficulty casting myself, 
surely it is others who cast me. I think what I really do is teach. I don’t ever have a sense that I do any-
thing other than teach.” Available at: http://www.nakedpunch.com/articles/21. 
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sent of non-European participants in a discursive situation. ‘Not a general problem but a 
European problem’ here means: ‘not a universal problem, but one which solely arises in 
Europe and ceases to be a problem beyond Europe.’ While I can agree with the first un-
derstanding of positionality as contextual background information that can serve to foster 
intersubjective understanding, I think the second understanding, whereby positionality 
delineates a perimeter within which argumentative claims have ‘regional validity’, is 
misguided, in the sense that it keeps individuals chained to their singularities and de-
prives them of the ability to reach out and experience universal truth – which brings me to 
my second objection. 
 
The more fundamental objection that can be raised against Spivak’s theory of the Sub-
ject is precisely that it is not a theory of the subject but rather a theory of the individual. By 
conflating both notions up to a point where they appear strictly coextensive, Spivak effec-
tively fixes singular human beings as ‘positionalised individuals’ anchored in their partic-
ularities, thereby preventing them from reaching full subjecthood which is characterised 
by a radical acceptance of universalism. The universal subject is thus constituted against 
and emerges out of the particular individual, as beautifully epitomised in statements by 
Saint Paul (‚There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all 
one in Christ Jesus‛ – Galatians 3: 28) or Frantz Fanon (‚My black skin is not the wrapping 
of specific values‛)73. By contrast, the dangers associated with fragmentation, parochialism 
and a form of narcissism of small differences have been captured in the equally beautiful 
words of warning attributed to Pastor Martin Niemöller.74 
 
For the remainder of this section, I will refer to the work of French philosopher Alain 
Badiou in order to outline an alternative theory of the constitution of subjects through 
fidelity to an Event, a sudden appearance in the order of arts, science, politics or love that 
unexpectedly shatters the everyday coordinates of individuals. Badiou’s writing is how-
                                               
73 In “Black Skin, White Masks” (1986: 226-227), Fanon writes: “I am a man, and what I have to recap-
ture is the whole past of the world. I am not responsible solely for the revolt in Santo Domingo. Every 
time a man has contributed to the victory of the dignity of the spirit, every time a man has said no to an 
attempt to subjugate his fellows, I have felt solidarity with his act. In no way should I derive my basic 
purpose from the past of the peoples of color. In no way should I dedicate myself to the revival of an 
unjustly unrecognized Negro civilization. I will not make myself the man of any past. *…+ It was not the 
black world that laid down my course of conduct. My black skin is not the wrapping of specific values.” 
74 “First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out—Because I was not a Socialist. 
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out—Because I was not a Trade Unionist. 
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—Because I was not a Jew. 
Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.” 
The quotation is displayed on a number of Holocaust Memorials in the United States. 
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ever notoriously difficult, in particular due to his predilection for mathematical formalism 
to discuss ontological issues. His views regarding the distinction between subjects and 
individuals have been perhaps most clearly expressed in a 2012 interview on the need to 
defend and renovate the figure of the Master in emancipatory politics, in which he ex-
plained that  
 
“*the global crisis of intellectuality], if we want to summarise, is characterised by the at-
tempt to replace the subject by the individual. What is a ‘subject’? It is the human being 
understood as a network of capacities that allow her/him to think, to create, to share, 
to act collectively, to go beyond her/his singularities, which is the condition of liberty. 
Sure enough, the subject is carried by the individual and her/his singularities – a body, 
an identity, a social position, various drives – but she/he is not limited to it. To be a sub-
ject is to circulate between singularity and universality” (Badiou and Roudinesco 
2012).75 
 
In response to Spivak’s sceptical relativism (which could be summed up as: there is no 
universal truth but only particular truth discourses that are momentarily accepted as valid 
within specific historical, cultural and geographical contexts, the development of which 
can be traced and retraced through genealogy or deconstruction), Badiou argues in Being 
and Event that universal truths exist but cannot be unified within the framework of a 
single metaphysical system. Instead truths are distributed between four ‚procedures‛ 
(arts, science, politics and love) that act as fields over which ‘irreducible singularities’ may 
occur in the form of an Event: a new pictorial arrangement; an unusual experimental 
result; a social movement; a romantic encounter. On each of these fields, the Event pre-
sents both an interruption of the normal order of knowledge as well as the promise of a 
novelty if the involved parties acknowledge the Event and decide to live accordingly. The 
snag is that Badiou’s Event is characterised by its undecidability: it is never possible to 
prove an Event, to scientifically demonstrate its existence. We never ‚know for sure‛ that 
we are in the presence of an Event and the Event can always be negated using the coordi-
nates of the prevailing order of knowledge. Instead, acknowledging an Event as such is 
always a bet, a hypothesis that ‘something is happening’, something worthy of fidelity – 
stated otherwise: recognising something as an Event is always a militant, an activist move, 
                                               
75 My translation from the original French: “[La crise globale de l’intellectualité], si l’on veut la résumer, 
se caractérise par la tentative de remplacer le sujet par l’individu. Qu’est-ce que le ‘sujet’ ? C’est l’être 
humain compris comme un réseau de capacités qui lui permettent de penser, créer, partager, agir collec-
tivement, aller au-delà de ses singularités, ce qui est la condition de la liberté. Bien sûr, le sujet est porté 
par l’individu et ses singularités – un corps, une identité, une position sociale, des pulsions – mais ne s’y 
réduit pas. Etre sujet, c’est circuler entre la singularité et l’universalité.” 
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but it cannot be the product of a rational calculus. Facing a hypothetical event, the ques-
tion for the affected parties becomes: ‘if there is more to what is happening than the usual 
play of things, what is the consequence for me? How can I rearrange my life in the light of 
this undecidable Event?’ The decision to embrace the Event through fidelity marks the 
beginning of a truth process.76 
 
For Badiou, the subject is the patient work of enquiry guided by the fidelity towards 
what may be an Event, with the aim of producing a truth that ‘punches holes’ in instituted 
knowledges.77 This truth is eternal in the sense that whoever recognises the Event as such 
and agrees to live up to its consequences will (re)discover in the past a virtually infinite 
number of precursory configurations of the same truth – for instance of an emancipated 
society in the field/procedure of politics (the figure of Spartacus is for instance recurrent in 
Badiou’s writings). These forerunners indicate to the subject that their truth is both histor-
ical (it can be traced during specific periods of history) and eternal (it has always existed, 
and it is constantly being reactivated throughout history). In the second volume of Being 
and Event, Badiou is then interested in the various modes in which the same, universal 
truth appears in what may be fundamentally different ‘worlds’. Of particular interest for 
our purposes in this study is the concept of subject-body (corps-sujet), which is ‚a mode 
of appearance in a world determined by a subject that has developed its fidelity to the 
trace of an event‛ (Meillassoux, 2010). The subject-body – that may be a single body but is 
more commonly a collective body such as an arts school, a group of scientists, an army, a 
party, or a couple – cannot be grasped by reference to the positionality, singularity or 
idiosyncratic features of the individual(s) that constitute(s) it. Rather, the subject is de-
fined by the devotion to the same truth-procedure (the apparition or bringing into exist-
ence of the inexistent) and sustained by the common fidelity to an uncertain Event, as in 
the climactic scene of Stanley Kubrick’s Spartacus where the recaptured slaves, despite the 
                                               
76 See for instance: “From which ‘decision’, then, stems the process of a truth? From the decision to 
relate henceforth to the situation from the perspective of its evental [événementiel] supplement. Let us 
call this a fidelity. To be faithful to an event is to move within the situation that this event has supple-
mented, by thinking (although all thought is a practice, a putting to the test) the situation ‘according to’ 
the event. And this, of course – since the event was excluded by all the regular laws of the situation – 
compels the subject to invent a new way of being and acting in the situation *…+ An evental fidelity is a 
real break (both thought and practised) in the specific order within which the event took place (be it 
political, loving, artistic or scientific). I shall call ‘truth’ (a truth) the real process of a fidelity to an event: 
that which this fidelity produces in the situation.” (Badiou 2001: 41-42) 
77 See for instance: “I shall call ‘subject’ the bearer [le support] of a fidelity, the one who bears a process 
of truth. The subject, therefore, in no way pre-exists the process. He is absolutely non-existent in the 
situation ‘before’ the event. We might say that the process of truth induces a subject.” (ibid. 43) 
5. Spivak’s aporia of representation or the need for a productive undoing of the Enlightenment 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised?                             63 
promise of leniency if they point to Spartacus, all identify themselves with ‘I am Sparta-
cus’ (not ‘I am a white, male, heterosexual Thracian slave and I support Spartacus’).78 
 
5.5 Bearing on the case 
 
Spivak’s writings offer the most far-reaching critique we have encountered so far against 
the possibility of an asymmetric international cooperation that genuinely empowers the 
weaker cooperation partner rather than depriving it of the ability to speak for itself. Using 
her persuasive insights of the politics of representation in colonial settings, the entire 
Tunisia in Transition project could very well be dismissed as an instance of ‚white lectur-
ers saving Arab students from Arab professors‛. Here, Tunisian doctoral students are 
fixed, through their participation in the project, in a subaltern position and defined from 
the outside – that is, by the German cooperation partner – as oppressed members of the 
mid-level university staff (akademischer Mittelbau, a category for which there does not even 
exist a linguistic equivalent in Arabic or French) caught in rigid and outdated hierarchies 
that impede their meritocratic professional developments and keep them subservient to 
more senior faculty members, particularly at the professorial level, who rose to positions 
of power under the dictatorship of Ben Ali (to which they mostly turned a complacently 
blind eye) at a time when appointment procedures at Tunisian universities were guided 
by personal connections rather than professional abilities. Thus re-presented (dargestellt), 
Tunisian participants in the project are assumed to be in a position where they cannot 
voice their concerns themselves, since their position of inferiority and dependence within 
Tunisian university structures condemns them to silence. It therefore becomes the (self-
assigned) role of the German cooperation partner to mediate and articulate these concerns 
(vertreten) vis-à-vis the higher levels of the Tunisian academic hierarchy. And indeed, 
numerous meetings were organised to that end in the framework of the ‚Tunisia in Tran-
                                               
78 Here, Badiou’s theory of the constitution of subject-bodies also comes with far-reaching ethical impli-
cations, since the ‘socialised human animal’ (Badiou’s name for the individual) is simply not an ethical 
category. Instead, it is the truth-process itself which is the condition of possibility of Good and Evil: is 
Evil the failure of the subject to live up to a fidelity. See for instance the appraisal of Badiou’s work in 
Matthews (2012: 127): “Against the radical indeterminacy of postmodernism, Alain Badiou reinstates 
the philosophical notions of being and truth. He renders the human animal as a subject only insofar as 
he or she displays fidelity to the event. The event is understood as part of the exceptional realm that 
stands unnamed and outside of the status quo.  As such, fidelity to the event always takes the form of 
militant radicalism. Truth is understood not as a transcendental absolute or as a verifiable category but 
as a form of fidelity. The event stands as a break with the existing situation, which offers an ethics based 
on affirmative principles. However, fidelity can never be certain or proved and it is from this basis that 
Badiou is able to name evil, not as a pre-existing quantity but solely in relation to the Good. The ethics 
of the event is predicated upon the subject’s rearrangement of previously established knowledge in 
pursuance of fidelity to the truth-process.” 
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sition‛ project, both with faculty professors and with senior officials from the Ministry of 
Higher Education of Scientific Research. It thus looks as if the politics of representation 
within ‘Tunisia in Transition’ organises the dispossession and disempowerment of Tuni-
sian students, paradoxically confined to subalterity by the very progressive and good-
intentioned forces that are set on helping and emancipating them – a paradox that has 
reached proverbial status in German (Das Gegenteil von gut ist gut gemeint). 
 
Nevertheless, I think this picture is too bleak to be entirely accurate. I see two reasons 
to be more optimistic regarding the possibility for the Tunisian subaltern to speak in the 
framework of the cooperation project. The first reason belongs to the order of Darstellung: 
despite the existence of formal requirements and overall strategic objectives on the side of 
the German funding agency that are undoubtedly conducive to the projection of the Ger-
man representative consciousness onto the potential cooperation partners, the develop-
ment of ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ was preceded by a number of smaller explorative projects 
during which the specific needs of the various involved parties were being investigated. 
To take a concrete example, the joint Letter of Intent of 9 January 2012 initially foresaw 
measures to increase the employability of graduates and modernise the teaching curricula, 
along with training activities in the field of university management.79 The emphasis on 
research methodologies within ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ was not explicitly mentioned in 
this document and came about progressively at the explicit request of Tunisian students – 
to use Spivakian language: the Tunisian subaltern was not constructed from the onset and 
from the outside as the undertrained graduate in dire need of methodological training. 
 
The second cause for optimism belongs to the order of Vertretung: although meetings 
did take place at senior level between Tunisian and German professors and lecturers to 
discuss the needs of the student body in the absence of student representatives, a real 
effort was made to associate Tunisian students and let them speak for themselves. In one 
particular instance, a meeting was organised between German project members, Tunisian 
participants, Tunisian professors and one representative from the Ministry. After a rather 
                                               
79 The official document is available in German at: 
http://www.tunis.diplo.de/contentblob/3394076/Daten/1865902/Downloaddatei_Abkommen_TP.pdf  
See for instance page 2: „Als ein weiteres Element des Netzwerks werden die tunesischen Ministerien für 
Bildung und für Hochschulbildung und der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD) die Beschäfti-
gungsfähigkeit von Hochschulabsolventen unter anderem durch die Modernisierung der Curricula für die 
schulische und universitäre Lehre, durch die Förderung des ,career-building’ für zurückkehrende Alumni, 
z. B. durch start-up grants und durch ein Sondermodul des CrossCulture-Praktika-Programms stärken. […] 
Tunesische und deutsche Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen werden ihre Kooperation ausbauen 
und auf Zukunftsthemen ausrichten, einschließlich Trainingsmaßnahmen im Bereich Hochschulmanage-
ment.“  
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rapid tour de table, the meeting was ‘hijacked’ by Tunisian students who very strategical-
ly used the presence of German cooperation partners to articulate with great outspoken-
ness and courage their specific needs (in particular the inadequacy of the methodological 
training, the lack of pedagogical training of university lecturers and professors in Tunisia, 
and the absence of emphasis on the development of students’ reflexive and critical facul-
ties). After this dramatic meeting, a Tunisian student expressed to me her satisfaction at 
having an opportunity ‘to spell out a few home truths for the first time’ (crever l’abscès pour 
la première fois) and underscored the absurdity of the fact that the presence of foreigners 
was needed for Tunisian professors and students to speak frankly to one another. 
 
These two examples nicely illustrate the point made earlier regarding the puzzling 
tendency of various strands of postmodernism to be even more structuralist than struc-
turalism itself. As far as Tunisia in Transition is concerned, I think it would be both incor-
rect and condescending to regard Tunisian students as subjectified individuals immured 
in their subalterity, traversed by flows of power that define them and rob them of the 
ability to speak out for themselves. Rather, a project such as Tunisia in Transition is evi-
dence that the agency of Tunisian students has to be acknowledged, particularly the ex-
tent to which they were able to use the international cooperation project to mitigate defi-
ciencies in the national higher education system through additional training and, more 
spectacularly, to strategically use the temporary protection enjoyed by the presence of 
international project partners to express their concerns and advance their interests in 
relative impunity (relative, since some form of retaliation may have taken place after the 
departure of the international project partners). 
 
6. Conclusion: Asymmetrical international cooperation beyond friendly colonialism 
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6. Conclusion: Asymmetrical international cooperation beyond friendly  
colonialism 
 
“*…+ every universal presents itself not as regularization of the particular or of some dif-
ferences, but as a singularity subtracted from identitarian predicates.”80 (Badiou 2004) 
 
Before closing this study, I believe it is appropriate to examine some of the arguments put 
forward by Uruguayan philosopher Eduardo Gudynas (2015) in a recent opinion piece in 
which he provocatively argued for the need to break with a form of ‚friendly colonial-
ism‛, understood as the intellectual and theoretical dependence of the Global South on a 
set of conceptual tools and methodological instruments developed in the North. In many 
respects, Gudynas offers a kind of concentrated version of Foucauldian and Spivakian 
theses – in many respects as well, the answer to Gudynas lies somewhere in between 
Habermas’ critical theory and Badiou’s post-Marxism.81 The notion of ‚friendly colonial-
ism‛ will then provide the yardstick to assess the ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ cooperation 
project and delineate the more general lessons that can be drawn from this project for 
legitimate international cooperation in asymmetrical settings. 
 
6.1 Escaping sterile accusations of Northern versus Bourgeois thinking 
 
The accusation of ‚friendly colonialism‛ is directed against a number of scholars and 
progressive governments in Latin America that draw inspiration from the conceptual 
work of Marxist geographer David Harvey, a British national based at the City University 
of New York. Gudynas’ attack can be summed up with two main assertions. First, he 
argues that it is legitimate to reject a potentially useful set of theories and concepts be-
cause they have their origin in the ‘academic North’ and that it is equally legitimate, if not 
normatively preferable, to work with the indigenous models and local knowledges devel-
oped by Latin American scholars. Second, Gudynas contends that Harvey’s Marxist con-
ceptual toolbox, even enriched with the notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, may 
help understand global trends but is however not useful to grasp local developments in 
Latin America. In the words of Gudynas:  
                                               
80 My translation from the French original version: “*…+ tout universel se présente, non comme régle-
mentation du particulier ou des différences, mais comme singularité soustraite aux prédicats identi-
taires.” 
81 The extent to which Badiou’s philosophical system ought to be characterised as ‘Marxist‘, ‘Marxian’, 
‘post-Marxist’, ‘neo-Marxist’ or even ‘post-Maoist’ is very much a matter of debate. For a major contri-
bution to this debate, see Bosteels (2005). 
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“this [Harvey] fashion leaves aside the rich history of Latin American reflections and 
brings us back right into the hands of Northern thought systems *…+. While critiques 
such as Harvey’s can be shared, they are in any event insufficient for the Latin American 
reality.”82  
 
Both arguments are reminiscent of the postmodern and poststructuralist literature that 
we have reviewed so far: on the one hand, the appeal to ‚the rich history of Latin Ameri-
can reflections‛ echoes Foucault’s plea in favour of an ‚insurrection of subjugated knowl-
edges‛; on the other hand, the analogy between Spivak’s insistence on the positionality of 
Derrida as a ‘Western theorist’ and Gudynas’ rejection of Harvey’s work as a ‘Northern 
thought system’ is striking. 
 
Predictably, Gudynas’ charge prompted a furious answer from Harvey’s team in Ec-
uador. In the tradition of orthodox Marxism, Martínez et al. (2015) defended the universal 
usefulness of Marxist templates for emancipatory struggles worldwide and pointed not to 
the geographical but to the class origins of Gudynas’ own conceptual apparatus:  
 
“In this regard, it is important to note that Gudynas’s concept of extractivism is itself 
based on theories such as the ‘Dutch disease’ and the ‘resource curse’ – theories that 
find their origin not only in ‘the North’ but above all in neoclassical economics, that is to 
say in a bourgeois thought system. This is a much more serious problem than geograph-
ic origin, while we are referring ourselves to a concept that aspires to be a useful tool in 
subaltern battles.”83 
 
My own position is that the way out of this dialogue of the deaf requires a mixture of 
Badiou and Habermas. From Badiou and the Hegelian tradition, I take the intuition that 
the relationship between universality and singularity is dialectical rather than strictly 
antithetical, that the Universal lies at the core of what presents itself as Singular. One may 
insist that ‘in some cultures’, people throw rice on the bride and groom on their wedding 
                                               
82 My translation from the Spanish original version: “La primera, es que esa ‘moda’ [de las repetidas 
invocaciones al geógrafo inglés David Harvey] deja de lado la rica historia de reflexiones latinoameri-
canas para volver a dejarnos en manos de pensamientos norteños. La segunda es que si bien pueden 
compartirse críticas como las de Harvey, de todos modos son insuficientes para la realidad latinoameri-
cana.” 
83 My translation from the Spanish original version: “En este respecto, es importante notar que el mismo 
concepto de ‘extractivismo’ de Gudynas está basado en las teorías de ‘enfermedad holandesa’ y la 
‘maldición de los recursos’ – teorías que no solamente son ‘del norte’ sino también de la economía 
neoclásica, es decir del pensamiento burgués. Este es un problema mucho más grave que su génesis 
geográfica, cuando estamos refiriéndonos a un concepto que tiene pretensiones de ser una herramienta 
útil en las luchas subalternas.” 
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day whereas ‘in other cultures’, people throw red beans or flower petals – or one may see 
these various cultural practices as local expressions of the universal human desire for 
fertility and abundance. In the case at hand, this means that it is largely pointless to op-
pose Marxist theory and Latin American empirical reality: the Marxist scholar is precisely 
interested in those features and cultural configurations of capitalism in Latin America that 
appear most singular and idiosyncratic, not in order to analytically distinguish between 
hypothetical ‚varieties of capitalism‛ but rather to better account for the contextually 
specific ways in which Capital is able to constantly revolutionise production, increase 
productivity as well as material wealth while putting an end to former feudal ties – an 
ability which, incidentally, had already compelled Marx and Engels’ admiration in the 
Communist Manifesto. 
 
From Habermas, I keep the commitment to discourse ethics as an imperfect but help-
ful procedure to transform a mere exchange of opinions into an exchange of reasoned 
arguments duly substantiated and opened to refutation. In the case at hand, it must be 
possible to organise a confrontation of conceptual models in the order of science between 
Harvey’s ‚accumulation by dispossession‛ (Harvey 2004) and Gudynas’ notion of ‚neo-
extractivism‛ (Gudynas 2012) with the aim of determining empirically which of the two 
possesses greatest explanatory power and, more importantly, of fine-tuning both concepts 
through mutual engagement and critique. This confrontation would be beneficial to both 
‘sides’: for instance, Gudynas claims that ecological issues have a greater saliency in Latin 
America (a proof he sees in the cult of the Peruvian deity pacha mama) or that indigenous 
people in Ecuador and Bolivia have developed specific understandings of value (sumac 
kawsay and suma qamaña) that put greater emphasis on non-material wealth and thus 
substantially diverge from and even challenge orthodox Marxism. If substantiated, these 
claims would prompt Harvey and other Marxist scholars to dedicate more attention to 
environmental problems and to alternative theories of value – a reformulation that would 
not simply be of relevance to Latin American countries but also to the very same countries 
where Marxism originated.84 
                                               
84 Despite having myself argued in favour of eco-socialism as a means to renovate the left through 
political ecology (Rousselin 2014: 178-182), I nonetheless believe that Gudynas’ rejection of Marxism is 
insufficiently grounded – for three main reasons. First and though this may be less true of subsequent 
Marxist scholars, issues such as natural resources, political ecology and environmental protection cer-
tainly figure prominently in Marx’s writings, especially in “Capital” – on this point, see for instance 
Foster (2000) and Hughes (2000). Second, references to pachamama in political discourses are mostly 
vague and tend to become a compulsory rhetoric exercise without programmatic content. As a matter 
of fact, those political forces that claim inspiration from pachamama to advertise their greater sensitivi-
ty to ecological issues often behave very much like other pro-growth parties when in government – on 
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6.2 So, at the end of the day, was “Tunisia in Transition” a neo-colonial  
cooperation project? 
 
Although it may be argued that my own positionality as a white European male and as an 
adviser, reviewer and lecturer in the framework of this project inevitably colours and 
perhaps severely impairs my judgement, I would like to sum up the reasons for which I 
believe that my conclusion – that ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ was not a neo-colonial endeav-
our – may have value beyond my own person and that my arguments may be rationally 
agreed with, irrespective of my readers’ own positionality. 
 
It is undeniable that the German cooperation partners enjoyed a structural power ad-
vantage over their Tunisian counterparts, primarily as a result of differences in material 
and technological resources (university budgets and staff, particularly the number of 
research assistants and in-house funding schemes; teaching and research infrastructures, 
particularly library resources and access to online journals). It is also true that, within 
‚Tunisia in Transition‛, these asymmetries grew stronger at the higher levels of the coop-
eration project: for instance, it has already been said that the definition of strategic objec-
tives was de facto a monopoly of the German funding agency DAAD, with next to no 
input from the Tunisian side. Yet, the same logic also applies to the German cooperation 
partners: the universities of Munich and Passau had to act within the scope of the parame-
ters and conditions set the DAAD for the Change by Exchange funding programme. Simi-
larly, the verticality of a number of teaching situations within the project cannot be read as 
a case of German lecturers imposing their views upon Tunisian students. Though it is true 
                                                                                                              
this point, see for instance Dangl (2014). Third, Gudynas himself acknowledges “that suma qamaña is 
not found in the everyday life of aymara rural communities, but that the terms were a recent creation, 
by the aymara sociologist Simón Yampara” (2011: 444). In addition, the same text somehow undermines 
Gudynas’ pamphlet on ‘friendly colonialism’ since, while Harvey’s positionality as a Northern geographer 
supposedly  limits the validity of his analyses, the scope of Buen Vivir is not itself limited by its position-
ality as an indigenous creation: “Buen Vivir is not restricted to indigenous postures. *…+ Buen Vivir 
should not be conceived as a position limited to non-Western knowledge, but as useful concept that can 
support and enhance critical traditions looking for alternatives to development.” Eventually, Gudynas 
rather begrudgingly admits the obvious overlap between Buen Vivir and the good, old-fashioned social-
ist tradition: “As the Buen Vivir moves in a post-capitalist direction, it is common for many people to 
assume that it is a new type of socialism or that there is a socialist trend towards the Buen Vivir. *…+ As a 
platform to explore and build alternatives beyond European modernity, it is moving away from Eurocen-
tric political thought. But, Buen Vivir did not imply a complete rupture with those traditions, but a 
selective adoption of some critical positions rather than others.” When taken together, these last two 
statements (regarding the transcultural relevance of Buen Vivir and the dialectical relationship between 
Socialism and Buen Vivir) offer a much more balanced, though arguably less fashionable, account than 
the definitive condemnation of Marxism as an instance of “friendly colonialism”. 
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that the lecturers were mostly Europeans, the group of participants was composed of both 
Tunisian and German postgraduates, so that German students were just as ‘oppressed’ as 
their Tunisian colleagues. Rather than a case of neo-colonialism, ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ 
thus rather begs the question of the power relations inherent in all teaching and learning 
situations: within the framework of the project, lecturers (whatever their nationality) were 
indeed placed, despite their best efforts to organise their seminars and workshops as 
horizontally and participatively as they could, in a position of power vis-à-vis project 
participants (whatever their nationality). Lastly, I also consider that the standard post-
colonial argument, according to which international cooperation all too often occurs on 
the basis of the template ‚white men are saving brown women from brown men‛, does 
not really hold in the case of ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ as it ignores the very real capacity of 
Tunisian participants to strategically use the project so as to voice their concerns and 
advance their interests, according to a template that might perhaps more appropriately be 
labelled ‚Arab students are using international observers to challenge Arab professors‛. 
 
This being said, I also believe that a number of opportunities were missed to further 
legitimise and to seek the assent of the Tunisian cooperation partners in a Habermasian 
fashion, through discursive engagement and reasoned argumentation opened to refuta-
tion. This is particularly true at the level of Tunisian professors. Since the short-term suc-
cess of the project was not conditional upon their active participation, one may say that 
the focus on Tunisian Nachwuchswissenschaftler/postgraduates was understandable and 
that it was also justified, given the concomitant existence of other (and better endowed) 
programmes with a focus on more senior faculty members. Nevertheless, it is also highly 
unlikely that ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ will produce sustainable long-term effects if it is not 
appropriated and carried forward by the Tunisian university hierarchy once the German 
cooperation partners have departed. 
 
6.3 What does this all mean for international cooperation? 
 
At this stage of our enquiry, three lessons can be drawn that may be of more general rele-
vance for international cooperation in asymmetrical settings. 
 
The first lesson is that the weaker cooperation partner may very well be willing to en-
gage even in the presence of fairly strong power asymmetries. Contrary to what has be-
come standard practice in many areas of international cooperation where expressions 
such as ‘dialogue at eye level’, ‘cooperation on an equal footing’ or ‘partnership among 
equals’ flourish even when they have no pertinence, there seems to be no need to artifi-
cially insist on the horizontal character of the overall cooperative endeavour. Indeed, 
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behind the empty rhetoric, such proclamations of non-verticality often allow power rela-
tions to play out unnoticed and unhindered – which usually serves the interest of the 
stronger party. A more demanding strategy is thus to recognise and jointly acknowledge 
the existence of power asymmetries, precisely in order to design a cooperation architec-
ture that ‚allows games of power to be played with a minimum of domination‛ – for 
instance, via the active search for the consent of the weaker party. 
 
The second lesson is the importance of rational, argumentative engagement in legiti-
mation processes. Importantly however, this argumentative engagement ought to be 
distinguished from pedagogy or bargaining. Indeed, the fundamental purpose of Haber-
masian discourse ethics is not to allow party A to convince party B that what A proposes 
is right, neither is it to offer B something in exchange for its support to A’s proposal. Ra-
ther, discourse ethics lays down a procedure whereby A and B cooperatively define what 
is right for both of them (as well as for everybody else), by means of an exchange of rea-
soned arguments and counter-arguments. The impracticability of Habermasian discourse 
ethics stems from the fact that neither foreign policy nor, for the most part, university 
teaching qualify as practical discourses guided by ‚a collective search for the truth‛. In-
stead, both settings are permeated by strategic interests and are therefore the realm of 
instrumental rather than communicative rationality: diplomats are bound to a set of pre-
defined national interests, from which they cannot break away simply because they have 
heard a convincing counter-argument; and even lecturers design their seminars and 
workshops strategically to achieve teaching objectives and cover topics laid down in pre-
determined academic programmes. This does not, however, mean that Habermasian 
discourse ethics ought to be thrown overboard – they remain useful as a compass. Work-
ing under the assumption that ‚relations of power are not something bad in themselves, 
from which one must free one’s self‛ (Foucault, 1988: 129), the conditions of the ideal 
speech situation can still serve to define three guiding principles that effectively allow 
games of power to be played with a minimum of domination (ibid.): the ability of the 
weaker cooperation partner to demand justification; the obligation of the stronger cooper-
ation partner to provide reasoned arguments rather than rely on sheer force; and the 
possibility for the weaker cooperation partner to refuse a course of action that is insuffi-
ciently justified (Rousselin forthcoming). 
 
The third and final lesson concerns what presents itself as a seemingly intractable con-
flict between universality and singularity – for instance, between the necessity of agreeing 
to common rules and procedures for the purpose of international cooperation on the one 
hand and the various calls to respect local identities and safeguard cultural differences on 
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the other. Using Badiou (and Hegel), we have been able to reject this binary opposition in 
favour of a more dialectical relationship, whereby individuals are not kept prisoners from 
their singularities but may reach out and gain access to the Universal by ‚subtracting their 
singularity from identitarian predicates‛, which constitutes them as full-fledged subjects. 
To come back to the Tunisian participant with whose playful remark this study began: by 
remaining firmly entrenched in his ‘identitarian predicate’ as a Tunisian national rather 
than putting forward the universality of his singular position as ‘one of the oppressed’, 
this participant actually prevented half of the participants in the project – namely: the 
German students – from joining in and lending him support in his effort to question the 
legitimacy of the domination exerted upon him. To a large extent, the same is true at the 
level of the international system. The cult of positionality and the continuous emphasis on 
the various identitarian predicates of the oppressed functions as a powerful obstacle to the 
development of transnational solidarity and genuine international cooperation. 
Acknowledgments 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised?                             73 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would first like to thank my colleagues in the ‚Tunisia in Transition‛ project, in particu-
lar Tasnim Abderrahim, Hela Abouda, Ramzi ben Amara, Salma Besbes, Chaïmae Bouaz-
zaoui, Amine Boughanmi, Elyès Bousbih, Rasmus Brandt, Asma ben Hadj Mbarek, Amir 
Hamid, Arwa Kooli, Christina Pauls, Houssem Rabhi, Edmund Ratka, Reinhardt Rum-
mel, Selima ben Salem, Hajer ben Slimen, Johanna Speyer, Bernhard Stahl, Ignaz Völk, 
Abderrahmen Yaalaoui, Marwa Yousfi and Mohamed Nidhal Zaier. Our conversations 
and sustained exchanges over the course of several years have been a prime source of 
inspiration for much of this study. In addition, my gratitude goes to the German project 
coordinators Laura-Theresa Krüger and Katharina McLarren for their time and support as 
well as for their willingness to share material with me during the drafting of this study. 
 
I would also like to thank my colleagues Luis Aue, Pol Bargués-Pedreny, Felix Bethke, 
Tobias Debiel, Otto Kallscheuer, Olivia Rutazibwa, Katrin Seidel, Karsten Schubert, Odila 
Triebel and Sarah Widmaier for their useful comments on earlier drafts and on the occa-
sion of a research colloquium in March 2016. 
 
Lastly, this study was conducted with the financial support of the ifa (Institut für 
Auslandsbeziehungen) and with the logistical support of the Käte Hamburger 
Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research. As always, the content is solely the re-
sponsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the official views of the fund-
ing agencies. 
 
References 
74             ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised? 
References 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (1998): Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Agamben, Giorgio (1999): Bartleby, or On Contingency, in: D. Heller-Roazen (ed.), Potentiali-
ties: Collected Essays in Philosophy, Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
 
Alcoff, Linda (1991-1992): The Problem of Speaking for Others, in: Cultural Critique 20, 5-32. 
 
Badiou, Alain (1988): L’Être et l’Événement. Paris, Seuil. 
 
Badiou, Alain (2003[1997]): Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. Stanford, Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Badiou, Alain (2004): Eight Theses on the Universal. Centre d'Étude de la Philosophie Fran-
çaise Contemporaine, available online at: http://www.lacan.com/badeight.htm. 
 
Badiou, Alain (2006): Logiques des mondes, l’être et l’événement. Paris, Seuil. 
 
Badiou, Alain and Roudinesco, Élisabeth (2012): Appel pour sauver la psychoanalyse, in: le 
Nouvel Observateur, 18 April. 
 
Baudrillard, Jean (1977): Oublier Foucault. Paris, Galilée. 
 
Berkman, Gisèle (2011): L’effet Bartleby. Philosophes lecteurs. Paris, Hermann. 
 
Bosteels, Bruno (2005): Post-Maoism: Badiou and Politics, in: Positions: East Asia Cultures 
Critique 13(3):575-634. 
 
Brown, Wendy (1998): Genealogical politics, in: J. Moss (ed.), The Later Foucault. Politics and 
philosophy. London, SAGE, 33-49. 
 
Browne, Jude (ed.) (2013): Dialogue, Politics and Gender. University of Cambridge. 
 
Callinicos, Alex (2006): The Resources of Critique. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
 
 
References 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised?                             75 
Callon, Michel and Latour, Bruno (1981): Unscrewing the big Leviathan: how actors macro-
structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so, in: K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicou-
rel (eds.), Advances in social theory and methodology. Toward an integration of micro- and 
macro-sociologies, Boston/London/Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Camargo, Ricardo. 2013. The New Critique of Ideology: Lessons from Post-Pinochet Chile. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Dangl, Benjamin (2014): The Politics of Pachamama, in: Counterpunch, 25 April, available 
online at: http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/04/25/the-politics-of-pachamama/. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles (1993): Bartleby ou la formule, in: Critique et clinique, Paris, Minuit. 
 
Derrida, Jacques (1996): Résistances de la psychanalyse. Paris, Galilée. 
 
Derrida, Jacques (1999): Donner la mort. Paris, Galilée. 
 
Duguid, Shona; Wyman, Emily; Bullinger Anke; Herfurth-Majstorovic, Katharina; and To-
masello, Michael (2014): Coordination strategies of chimpanzees and human children in a 
Stag Hunt Game, in: Proceedings of the Royal Society B 281: 20141973 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.1973. 
 
Eagleton, Terry (1999): In the Gaudy Supermarket, in: London Review of Books 21(10): 3-6, 
available online at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n10/terry-eagleton/in-the-gaudy-
supermarket. 
 
Faubion, James (ed.) (2000): Power/The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-84, Volume 3, 
London, Penguin Books. 
 
Foster, John Bellamy (2000): Marx’s Ecology, Materialism and Nature. New York, Monthly 
Review Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel (1972[1969]): The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Lan-
guage. New York, Pantheon Books. 
 
Foucault, Michel (1982): The Subject and Power, in: Critical Inquiry 8(4):777-795. 
 
References 
76             ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised? 
Foucault, Michel (1988): The ethic of care for the self and the practice of freedom: an inter-
view with Michel Foucault on January 20
th
, 1984, in: James Bernauer and David Rasmussen 
(eds.), The Final Foucault, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel (1990[1976]): The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction. London, 
Penguin Books. 
 
Foucault, Michel (2003[1976]): Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the College de France 
(1975-1976). New York, Picador. 
 
Foucault, Michel (2005[1966]): The Order of Things. Routledge. 
 
Foucault, Michel (2005[2001]): The Hermeneutics of the Subject – Lectures at the Collège de 
France 1981-82. New York, Palgrave-McMillan. 
 
Foucault, Michel (2007): What is Critique?, in: M. Foucault, The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, 
Semiotext(e), 41-81. 
 
Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John (2001): Non-Cooperation In Dialogue Logic, in: Synthese 
127(1): 161-186. 
 
Gordon, Colin (ed.) (1980): Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings (1972-
1977) by Michel Foucault, New York, Pantheon Books. 
 
Gudynas, Eduardo (2011): Buen Vivir: Today’s tomorrow, in: Development 54(4): 441-447. 
 
Gudynas, Eduardo (2012): Estado compensador y nuevos extractivismos, in: Nueva Sociedad 
237: 128-146. 
 
Gudynas, Eduardo (2015): La necesidad de romper con un colonialismo simpatico, in: Rebe-
lión, 30 September, available online at: http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=203858. 
 
Guillaume, Xavier (2002): Foreign Policy and the Politics of Alterity: A Dialogical Understand-
ing of International Relations, in: Millenium, Journal of International Studies 31(1): 1-26. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1973): Wahrheitstheorien, in: H. Fahrenbach (ed.), Wirklichkeit und 
Reflexion. Pfüllingen: Neske. 211–265. 
 
References 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised?                             77 
Habermas, Jürgen (1984[1981]): Theory of Communicative Action Volume One: Reason and 
the Rationalization of Society. Boston, Beacon Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1987a[1981]): Theory of Communicative Action Volume Two: Liveworld 
and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston, Beacon Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1987b[1985]): The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge, MIT 
Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1990[1983]): Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cam-
bridge, MIT Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1996[1992]): Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001a[1971]): On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction. Cambridge, Polity 
Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001b[1991]): Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. 
Cambridge, MIT Press. 3
rd
 ed. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (2003): Truth and Justification. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2000): Empire. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
 
Harvey, David (2004): The 'new' imperialism: accumulation by dispossession, in: Socialist 
Register 40: 63-87. 
 
Hugues, Jonathan (2000): Ecology and Historical Materialism. Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
 
Kelly, Michael (ed.) (1994): Critique and Power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. 
Cambridge/London, MIT Press. 
 
Latour, Bruno (1993[1991]): We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Latour, Bruno (2004[1999]) Politics of Nature. How to bring the sciences into democracy. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
References 
78             ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised? 
Latour, Bruno (2005): From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik – An Introduction to Making Things 
Public, in: B. Latour and P. Weibel, Making Things Public-Atmospheres of Democracy, cata-
logue of the show at ZKM, MIT Press, 2005. 
 
Linklater, Andrew (2005): Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process, in: Review of Interna-
tional Studies 31(1): 141-154. 
 
Martínez, Estefanía; Morales, Verónica; Simbaña, Carla; Wilson, Japhy; Fernández, Nora; 
Purcell, Thomas and Rayner, Jeremy (2015): Ni colonialistas, ni simpáticos: una respuesta a 
Eduardo Gudynas, in : La Linea de Fuego, 13 October, available online at: 
http://lalineadefuego.info/2015/10/13/ni-colonialistas-ni-simpaticos-una-respuesta-a-
eduardo-gudynas/. 
 
Matthews, Graham (2012): Ethics and Desire in the Wake of Postmodernism: Contemporary 
Satire. Continuum Literary Studies, London/New York, Bloomsbury Publishing. 
 
Meillassoux, Quentin (2010): Histoire et Événement chez Alain Badiou. Intervention au sém-
inaire ‘Marx au XXIème siècle : l’esprit et la lettre’, available online at: 
http://www.marxau21.fr/index.php/textes-figures-du-marxisme/badiou-alain/83-histoire-
et-evenement-chez-alain-badiou. 
 
Mendieta, Eduardo (2009): From imperial to dialogical cosmopolitanism, in: Ethics & Global 
Politics 2(3): 241-258. 
 
Rabinow, Paul (ed.) (1984): The Foucault Reader, New Yok, Pantheon Books. 
 
Rabinow, Paul (ed) (1997): The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-84. Volume One: 
Ethics. New York, The New Press. 
 
Rousselin, Mathieu (2014): Widerstand. Aktuelle Texte und Filme der französischen Kapita-
lismuskritik. Münster, Westfälisches Dampfboot. 
 
Rousselin, Mathieu (2015): Power, Resistance and the Possibility of Nonviolence, in: Critique 
73, Journal of Socialist Theory 43(3-4): 501-519. 
 
Rousselin, Mathieu (forthcoming): Kann Vernunft Macht ausgleichen? Habermas und die 
Legitimation asymmetrischer Kooperation, ifa Input 1/2017, Stuttgart: Institut für Auslands-
beziehungen. 
 
References 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised?                             79 
Simon, Jonathan (1994): Between Power and Knowledge: Habermas, Foucault, and the 
Future of Legal Studies, in: Law & Society Review 28(4): 947-961. 
 
Smith, Dinitia (2002): Creating a Stir Wherever She Goes, in: New York Times, February 9
th
, 
available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/09/arts/creating-a-stir-wherever-she-
goes.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1994[1988]): Can the Subaltern Speak?, in: P. Williams and L. 
Chrisman (eds.), Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, Hemel Hemstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 66–111. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1994b): Bonding in Difference, in: A. Arteaga (ed.), An Other 
Tongue: Nation and Ethnicity in the Linguistic Borderlands. Durham, Duke University Press, 
273–285. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1999): A Critique of Post-Colonial Reason: Toward a History of 
the Vanishing Present. Cambridge/London, Harvard University Press. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (2012): An aesthetic education in the era of globalization. Cam-
bridge/London, Harvard University Press. 
 
O’Sullivan, Simon (2010): Lacan’s ethics and Foucault’s ‘care of the self: two diagrams of the 
production of subjectivity (and of the subject’s relation to truth), in: Parrhesia 10, 51-73. 
 
Tomasello, Michael (2009): Why We Cooperate. MIT Press. 
 
Tomasello, Michael (2016): A Natural History of Human Morality. Harvard University Press. 
 
Tully, James (1999): To Think and To Act Differently. Foucault’s four reciprocal objections to 
Habermas’ theory, in: S. Ashenden and D. Owen, Foucault contra Habermas, Recasting the 
dialogue between genealogy and critical theory, London: SAGE, 90-142. 
 
Žižek, Slavoj (1989): The Sublime Object of Ideology. London, Verso. 
 
Žižek, Slavoj (2006): The Parallax View. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
Žižek, Slavoj (2009): Violence. London, Profile Books. 
 
References 
80             ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised? 
Institutional Websites 
 
Official website of the Tunisia in Transition project: http://tunisia-in-transition.org/ 
 
Official website of the University of Passau (Chair of International Politics) for the Tunisia in 
Transition project: http://www.phil.uni-passau.de/internationalepolitik/forschung/tunisia-
in-transition/ 
 
Official website of the University of Munich (Institute for Near and Middle Eastern Studies) 
for the Tunisia in Transition project: http://www.naher-osten.uni-
muenchen.de/forschung/forsch_tunesien/index.html 
 
Official website of the German Academic Exchange Service for the Change by Exchange 
programme: http://www.changebyexchange.de/en/ 
 
Official website of the German Academic Exchange Service including a list of and short re-
ports on ongoing German-Tunisian cooperation projects: 
https://www.daad.de/miniwebs/ictunis/de/21356/index.html 
 
Official website of the German-Tunisian Transformation Partnership: 
http://www.allemagnepartenaire.tn/Fr/accueil_46_4 
 
Official website of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Transformation Partner-
ship: http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/sid_DD622615B7C154A1F9E3CAC64BA771DB/EN/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpu
nkte/NaherMittlererOsten/Umbrueche_TSP/150624_TransfPartnerschaften_node.html 
 
Official website of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Deauville Partnership: 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/GlobaleFragen/G7-
G20/Deauville_node.html 
 
Annex 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Can Asymmetrical Cooperation Be Legitimised?                             81 
Annex 
 
Annex 1: Project description (project website)
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About the Project 
‚Tunisia in Transition‛ is a German-Tunisian research project. It analyses the transfor-
mation processes in Tunisia and the Arab world as well as the German and European 
policies towards North Africa and the Middle East. The project aims to set up an interdis-
ciplinary research group of young academics coming from both shores of the Mediterra-
nean. It provides a platform for collaborative research and offers additional academic 
training. 
 
Tunisia in Transition consists of two project units which are funded by the German 
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) with support from the Foreign Office in the frame-
work of the German-Tunisian Transformation Partnership: 
 
The Chair of International Politics at the University of Passau (Prof Stahl) administers 
the research cluster ‚Tunisia in Transition – International Relations‚, thereby also cooper-
ating with the University’s Chair of Journalism. The project runs a research office at La 
Manouba University. 
 
The research cluster ‚Tunisia in Transition – Ethnographies of Transition‛ is adminis-
tered by the Institute for Near and Middle Eastern Studies at Ludwig Maximilians Uni-
versity in Munich (Prof Kaplony). The project runs a research office at Sousse University. 
 
The following Tunisian partner institutions are involved in the project: 
 Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University Tunis-el Manar (FDSPT) 
 Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences at the University of Carthage 
(FSJPST) 
 Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of La Manouba (FLAH) 
 Institute of Press and Communication Sciences at the University of La Manouba 
(IPSI) 
 Institute of Work and Social Studies at the University of Carthage (INTES) 
Since 2014: 
 Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Sousse 
 Faculty of the Arts and the Humanities of the University of Sousse 
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Annex 2: Project description (University of Passau)
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Tunisia in Transition 
The Chair for International Politics at the University of Passau coordinates the interna-
tional and interdisciplinary research project Tunisia in Transition. 
 
The project aims to set up a German-Tunisian research group, which analyses the trans-
formation of the Arab world and the German and European policies in the MENA-region. 
Funding is provided by the German Foreign Ministry through the German Academic 
Exchange Service. 
 
Partner institutions 
The following Tunisian partner institutions are involved in the project: 
 Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University Tunis-el Manar (FDSPT) 
 Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences at the University of Carthage 
(FSJPST) 
 Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of La Manouba (FLAH) 
 Institute of Press and Communication Sciences at the University of La Manouba 
(IPSI) 
 Institute of Work and Social Studies at the University of Carthage (INTES) 
 Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of Sousse 
On the Tunisian side, the project is coordinated by Salma Besbes and Tasnim Abder-
rahim in Tunis and Dr Ramzi Ben Amara in Sousse. In addition, the Chair of International 
Politics cooperates closely with the Institute of Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the 
Ludwig Maximilans University in Munich (Prof Andreas Kaplony). In Passau, the Chair 
of Journalism is associated with the project (Prof Oliver Hahn). 
 
Project Activities 
 Joint Closing Session in Tunis, November 2015. 
 German-Tunisian authors' workshop in Passau, October 2015. 
 Scientific writing workshop in Tunis, April 2015. 
 Methodology workshop in Tunis, February 2015. 
 Authors' workshop in Passau, November 2014. 
 Coordination Meeting in Tunis, June 2014. 
 IR Research and Writing Workshops in Tunis, May 2014. 
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 Joint Workshop in Munich, October 2013. 
 Seminar on Methods in the Social Sciences, Tunis, June 2013. 
 Visit of the Tunisian ambassador Elyes Ghariani in Passau, May 2013. 
 Doctoral colloquium at La Manouba University, Tunis, May 2013. 
 Research and Methods seminar in Tunis, March 2013. 
 
Annex 3: Project description (University of Munich)
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Tunesien im Wandel 
 
Deutsch-arabische Transformationspartnerschaft - al Tawasul 
Kooperationsprojekt mit der Universität Passau und den tunesischen Universitäten Tunis-
el-Manar, Carthage und La Manouba. Gefördert im Rahmen der deutsch-arabischen 
Transformationspartnerschaft des Deutschen Akademischen Austausch Dienstes (DAAD) 
durch Mittel des Auswärtigen Amtes 
 
Die interdisziplinäre deutsch-tunesische Forschungsgruppe „Tunesien im Wandel‚ 
mit den beiden Projekteinheiten Medien und Islam (München) und Governance und 
Internationale Beziehungen (Passau) erforscht den gegenwärtigen tunesischen Transfor-
mationsprozess in seiner politischen, sozio-ökonomischen, kulturellen und internationa-
len Dimension. Inhaltlich liegt der Schwerpunkt in München auf den Themen „Massen-
medien in Tunesien‚ sowie der „Entwicklung des politischen Islam‚. Hier besteht eine 
enge Kooperation mit dem Projekt Arabische Massenmedien. 
 
Die Forschungsgruppe beschäftigt sich insbesondere mit der Frage nach der Rolle der 
Medien in Revolution und Transformation und inwieweit der „der arabische Frühling‚ 
die Medien und die Medienlandschaft in Tunesien verändert hat. Zudem wird ein Archiv 
über die Berichterstattung der Parlamentswahl 2013 angelegt. Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt 
liegt auf der Entwicklung der islamischen Parteien und ihre inhaltliche Ausrichtung wäh-
rend des Wahlkampfs im Juni 2013. 
 
Sie soll in der tunesischen Hochschullandschaft strukturbildend wirken und eine bei-
spielgebende Plattform sein, in deren Rahmen insbesondere tunesische Nachwuchswis-
senschaftler vernetzt und anwendungsorientiert arbeiten können. Neben einer originiären 
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und für den tunesischen Transformationsprozess relevanten Forschungsleistung soll 
damit ein Beitrag zur Modernisierung der Hochschulstrukturen in den Geistes- und Sozi-
alwissenschaften geleistet werden. 
 
Die Forschungsgruppe wird von der LMU München (Prof. Dr. Andreas Kaplony, 
Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft) und der Universität Passau (Prof. Dr. Bernhard Stahl, 
Internationale Politik) gemeinsam mit den tunesischen Universitäten Tunis-el-Manar, 
Carthage und La Manouba getragen. Inhaltlich umfasst sie die Kultur-, Politik-, Rechts- 
und Kommunikationswissenschaften. Die interdisziplinäre Multilateralität auf beiden 
Seiten dient nicht nur der akademischen Qualität und Originalität des Projekts, sondern 
befördert vor allem die in Tunesiens Hochschullandschaft so notwendige fächer- und 
hochschulübergreifende Zusammenarbeit und Vernetzung. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For more detailed information on the project activities (including the programmes of the 
various seminars and workshops), please contact the author. 
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„ It is undeniable that the German cooperation partners 
enjoyed a structural power advantage over their Tuni-
sian counterparts, primarily as a result of differences 
in material and technological resources […].“ 
Whether it is ‘dialogue at eye level’, ‘cooperation on an 
equal footing’ or ‘partnership among equals’ – the vocab-
ulary of international cultural and educational policy 
suggests that interpersonal and interstate cooperation 
is legitimate if and only if it is somehow shielded from 
power relations. For this reason, North-South coopera-
tion is regularly criticised by postcolonial researchers as 
a form of prolongation of imperial modes of inter action. 
This research will investigate whether asymmetric 
cooperation may nonetheless be legitimised if it leads 
to effective problem-solving and/or generates emanci-
patory effects. Is genuine horizontality in bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation ever possible? Can there be 
such a thing as a non-colonialist foreign cultural and  
educational policy? Close attention will be paid to 
the possibility for the weaker cooperation partner to 
demand and obtain rational justifications from more 
powerful cooperation partners. This tension will be ex-
amined on the basis of a critical and reflexive analysis of 
the DAAD project “Tunisia in transition”, involving  
collaboration between German and Tunisian universities.
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